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Diplomityön tavoitteena on tutkia valittujen Kaakkois-Euroopan maiden 
sähkömarkkinoiden vapauttamista ja niiden tämän hetkistä tilaa. Lisäksi työssä tutkitaan 
onko odotettuja alueellisen yhteistyön tuomia etuja mahdollista saavuttaa valitulla 
alueella. Sähkömarkkinoiden tilaa ja vapausasteita kartoitetaan saatavilla olevien 
raporttien ja julkaisujen perusteella. Yhteistyön synnyttämien etujen saavuttamisen 
tutkimiseksi työssä suoritetaan alueellisen markkinan simulointi, jonka lähtöarvot 
perustuivat alueen todelliseen dataan.  
 
Työn tutkimus on rajattu alueellisen yhteistyön kannalta vain päivittäismarkkinoihin. 
Näin ollen rahoitusmarkkinat, päivän sisäiset markkinat sekä säätösähkömarkkinat 
jäävät tutkimuksen ulkopuolelle. Lisäksi infrastruktuurinen integraatio ja tarvittavien 
instituutioiden ja toimintatapojen kartoitus eivät kuulu tämän työn rajaukseen. 
 
Tehty sähkömarkkinakatsaus osoittaa, että sähkömarkkinoiden uudistaminen ja 
vapauttaminen on edennyt vakaasti ja lupaavasti kaikissa tutkituissa maissa. 
Huomionarvioista on tosin se, että maat ovat hyvin eri vaiheissa uudistustensa kanssa. 
Simulaation tuloksien selvitys jaettiin kolmeen osaan: tuotantokapasiteettien aktivoinnin 
analysointi, hintojen analysointi ja odotettujen sähkönsiirtojen analysointi. Yleisesti 
simuloinnin tulokset osoittavat että alueellisen yhteistyön tuomat edut on mahdollista 
saavuttaa Kaakkois-Euroopan alueella. Simuloinnin osoittamat vakaat sähkön hinnat 
indikoivat tuotannon erikoistumista ja tehokasta allokointia. Lisäksi yhtenäiset sähkön 
hinnat koko vuoden ympäri luovat turvallisen ympäristön sähkösektorin investoinneille 
ja näin edelleen edistävät markkinoiden vapauttamisprosesseja. 
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Abstract 
This thesis aims to study the current electricity market liberalization status in the selected 
jurisdictions in the South East Europe and investigate if the expected benefits of regional 
cooperation in electricity market could be achieved in the region. The current states of 
market openings in South East Europe jurisdictions are researched based on the available 
reports and literature. In addition, regional day ahead market simulations are carried out 
to investigate the possibility of reaching the benefits. The simulation relies on the existing 
underlying data of the selected regional electricity sector.  
 
The research in this study is limited to the day ahead part of the regional market setup. 
Thus, financial markets, intraday markets and balancing markets are not taken into 
account. Furthermore, integration in infrastructure, regulatory institutions and 
commercial practices are also left out of the scope and analysis. 
 
It was found that there has been quite stable and well progress in the electricity sector 
reforms in the selected jurisdictions. However, the reforms are in quite difference phases 
in different jurisdictions. Simulation result analysis was broke into three parts: generation 
utilization, prices and electricity flows. Overall, the simulation results indicate that the 
benefits of regional a cooperation in the electricity markets could be achieved within the 
selected region. Stable prices and change in production patterns seen in simulation results 
indicate better specialization in electricity production for South East Europe region. In 
addition, even electricity prices during a whole year would provide safe environment for 
electricity sector investments and further assist the reform processes. 
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1 Introduction 
Traditionally national electricity markets have mainly been based on bilateral contracts 
and thus lacking transparency and free trading. Furthermore, majority of the electricity 
production capacities and electricity generation business and have been often owned by 
the same state owned enterprise. In many cases, these same enterprises have also been 
involved in other electricity market related activities such as electricity transmission and 
distribution operations. European Union took initiative to steer the member countries for 
electricity market liberalization and unbundling of the energy field activities. In order to 
reach these goals European Union has introduced several liberalization directives. Latest 
of them, third energy package, entered into force in 2009 aiming to fully open the 
electricity markets in the European Union member countries. Nordics and Western 
Europe have been leading the way in the liberalization processes and already have 
organized open electricity markets through power exchanges. In addition, both vertical 
and horizontal unbundling of the energy sector activities have been progressing smoothly 
in these areas. Recently, the liberalization trend has been spreading to South Eastern 
Europe. In the past few decades the countries in the region have initiated energy sector 
reforms and thus they are now heading towards full unbundling of the electricity market 
activities and wholesale market opening. Electricity market liberalization theory 
background indicates that a regional cooperation in the electricity sector would be 
beneficial next step for the South Eastern Europe. 
 
The goal of this thesis is to study the current electricity market liberalization statuses in 
the selected jurisdictions in the South East Europe. The selected jurisdiction set includes 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. This country set is selected for this study 
so that they do not have any existing functional regional collaboration in electricity 
markets. In order to further investigate if the benefits of a regional cooperation could be 
achieved in the selected region, simulations for a regional day ahead market are carried 
out in this study. The simulation relies on the existing underlying data of the selected 
regional electricity sector. The research in this study is limited to the day ahead part of 
the regional market setup. Thus, financial markets, intraday markets and balancing 
markets are not taken into account. Furthermore, integration in infrastructure, regulatory 
institutions and commercial practices are also left out of the scope and analysis. 
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This study is divided into six main chapters where the chapters from two to four provide 
general background information about the electricity market liberalization and an 
overview of the current state in the electricity sectors of the selected jurisdictions. 
Building on top of the background study, the chapters from five to seven concentrate on 
the benefits of the regional cooperation in electricity markets and analyzes the regional 
day ahead market simulation results. The literature research part of this study will start 
up by introducing the basic theory background behind the electricity market 
liberalization. In addition, a brief outlook to European Union energy policy development 
is given. In chapter four the latest states of the electricity sectors in the selected South 
East European jurisdictions are presented. The respective electricity sectors are 
researched both from regional and national perspective. Chapter four continues the 
outlook of the selected region by investigating the current state of the market openings in 
the selected jurisdictions. Market opening statuses are examined from horizontal and 
vertical unbundling point of views and in addition the current customer eligibility 
thresholds and overall market openness situations are presented.  
 
The last three main chapters of this study concentrate on the regional cooperation and on 
the expected benefits of it. Chapter five introduces the concept of regional power markets 
and the benefits related to it. In addition, recommended market model for South East 
Europe region is discussed. Also an example of a functional regional cooperation is given 
by providing a brief overview to the European Price Coupling of Regions.  Chapter six 
lays the background for the regional day ahead market simulations by introducing the 
input values, intended scope and the required assumptions.  Also the price optimization 
algorithm which was used in the simulations is briefly explained. Furthermore, the 
simulation procedure and fictional regional market area setup is illustrated. Finally, the 
gained simulation results are analyzed, possible benefits are reflected and conclusions are 
drawn.  
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2 Liberalization of electricity markets 
Liberalization of electricity markets requires certain perquisites and reforms at many 
levels of the electricity sector. However, there are several benefits which can be achieved 
with a successful liberalization and reform process. Usually the liberalization of 
electricity markets includes establishing open electricity markets through power 
exchanges. The theory behind electricity market liberalization and the potential benefits 
are discussed in this chapter. In addition, brief overlook to European Union targets is 
given. Finally, it is presented why the liberalization process should include transforming 
from bilateral markets to exchange markets.  
2.1 Electricity market liberalization 
Energy sectors have long been characterized by vertically integrated natural monopolies 
due to the importance of the secure electricity supply and its impacts on the societal and 
environmental welfare. Vertical integration means that the components of the electricity 
supply chain consisting of generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply were 
mainly owned by same enterprise. In addition, the energy sectors have historically been 
strictly regulated. Therefore, vertically integrated energy sector typically has high 
operating costs, high construction costs for new utilities, high retail prices and falling 
costs of production. Thus, the old-fashioned energy field led to costly large-scale 
investments, low-quality service and lack of competition in generation and supply 
business. In order to improve the situation, the energy sector reform process has been 
ongoing in many countries worldwide in the last three decades. The goal has been to 
arrange the energy sector in a new way to provide long-term benefits to society by 
producing electricity in respect to actual marginal costs of production. However, it has 
been widely accepted that distribution and transmission services should remain mostly as 
natural monopolies to maintain the security of supply. (Joskow 2008, Bacon, Besant-
Jones 2001) 
 
One the main drivers for energy sector reform is poor performance of state-run electricity 
entities resulting in high costs, insufficient expansion of network system and unreliable 
supply. Furthermore, the driving forces to initiate a reform are the lack of the required 
expansion of the energy sector, the need for a large amount of subsidies and gains for 
government from selling the energy sector components to private entities. Bacon and 
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Besant-Jones write that successful electricity market liberalization creates three sources 
of improved economic performance. First of them is better overall allocation of resources 
which lowers the prices to match the marginal costs of production. This improvement 
source includes also termination of the subsidy programs. These programs may produce 
major welfare losses in terms of overall economic welfare. Secondly, open market and 
competitive environment encourages for efficient use of the generation capacity and for 
innovations to lower the production costs. Lastly, increased competition will in most 
cases lower the electricity prices and thus transfer some of the positive impacts to the end 
customers as well. (Bacon, Besant-Jones 2001) 
 
In order to initiate reform of an energy sector, there should be positive atmosphere 
towards the reform and the need for it should be generally perceived. In addition, the 
reform also needs be pursued by the political authorities in the area and it is required to 
be politically feasible to archive. The mutual positive atmosphere towards the energy 
sector reform is usually natural consequence of badly performing existing system. Thus, 
the reform is more likely to take place in such systems where obvious problems do exist 
such as electricity outages or shortage of supply. Political approval and feasibility for 
reform is important since the reform most likely includes privatization and unbundling of 
publically owned assets and deregulation of electricity prices. (Bacon, Besant-Jones 
2001) 
 
Liberalization of electricity markets can be achieved in multiple ways. However, in most 
cases the liberalization process contains some mix of increasing competition, reducing 
regulation and privatization of the industry. Similar to all processes, they include 
subjecting energy sector utilities to market forces i.e. replacing monopolies with open 
competition. Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento introduce six factors which should be 
accomplished in successful deregulation process. The number of the active players is 
identified as one of the most important factor in restructuring process. Regardless of the 
market model, if there are only few big market players they tend to have too dominant 
position in the markets.  Therefore, they can manipulate the electricity prices by holding 
some of their capacity from the markets or offer electricity at unrealistically low prices. 
On the contrary, if market has many active players then each individual player has less 
effect on the market prices. Thus, market manipulation becomes much more difficult and 
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has less effect. Second factor is the rules of the bidding procedure within the market. 
Bidding procedure defines the way the market price is formed and therefore it should be 
designed so that it can increase the market efficiency. Next identified factor is 
organization of the demand side operation. Basically, there are two ways of organizing 
demand side, it can either be based on demand forecasts or it can be real-time demand 
response. Forecast based demand planning can increase generators’ market power when 
the demand level is fixed and can be estimated easily. However, the more modern 
approach, real time demand response, gives the consumers more power to adjust their 
consumption to low price hours. Real time demand response also supports better the 
actual marginal cost based generation of the electricity. Fourth factor for successful 
deregulation process is supportive operation of the transmission grid. In order for 
electricity markets to function efficiently, the transmission grid cannot be too congested. 
Thus, electricity transmission grid needs to be operated in such way that the electricity 
can flow freely according to the calculated optimal schedules. This will also further lower 
the dominant position of the big market players since electricity flows will balance deficit 
and excess areas and compensate prices. Diversity of generation technologies is 
introduced as fifth factor to impact the outcome of the competitive market. Higher 
diversity in generation possibilities will reduce the volatility of the market prices. Finally, 
ownership structure has some impact on the successfulness of a competitive market. 
Mainly private owned supply side tends to aim for profit maximization whereas mainly 
state owned generation might have wider objective than purely pursuit maximum profits. 
The mix of these two ownership types and goals in electricity market has effect on market 
prices. (Kopsakangas-Savolainen, Svento 2012) 
 
Joskow elaborates the standard liberalization prescription for restructuring electricity 
markets. The prescription starts with horizontal and vertical unbundling of the energy 
sector. Vertical unbundling means privatization of the state-owned electricity monopolies 
and separation of potentially competitive segments from natural monopoly activities. This 
means legally separating different parts of electricity market operations such as 
transmission, distribution, exchange and regulatory operations. One important part of 
vertical unbundling is creation of an independent transmission system operator to ensure 
the security of the grid, maintain balance in grid and to support electricity market by 
scheduling the electricity flows. Horizontal unbundling includes restructuring of the 
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generation segment to create sufficient amount of competition to markets in order to 
spread the market power and ensure competitive electricity prices. Next step in the 
liberalization prescription is creation of a voluntary public wholesale spot electricity 
markets and operating reserve markets. The main objective for these two is to create 
economically beneficial trading opportunities for suppliers and consumers and to further 
in economically effective manner balance supply and demand. Furthermore, reserve 
markets are meant to provide quick response for disturbances in electricity balances and 
increase the security of the transmission grid. Also developing active demand side 
response institutions to enhance real time demand response is part of the reform 
prescription. Liberalization prescription describes also adoption of such regulatory rules 
which provide equal access to transmission network for all market players. In addition, 
an efficient allocation of the transmission capacities should be included in the efficient 
adoption of the regulatory rules. Related to the adoption of rules, it is proposed that an 
independent regulatory agency should be established to monitor the market and to 
regulate the pricing of the natural monopolies in the energy sector such as distribution 
and transmission operations. Finally, the prescription recommends the abolition of the 
retail tariffs. (Joskow 2008) 
 
2.2 EU energy policy development 
The push for electricity market liberalization in Europe originates mainly from the 
European Union (EU). The process towards liberalized national markets started already 
in late 1996, as can be seen in Figure 1, when the European Parliament introduced the 
first electricity market liberalization package. This directive provided progressive market 
opening scheme so that from 1999 to 2003 member states were required liberalize 25-33 
percent of their national markets. This further began the unbundling of the electricity 
market activities. (Eising 2002) 
 
 13 
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of EU Energy Policy (Eurelectric 2011) 
 
The second liberalization package was given in 2003 and the package contained series of 
measures to further open the national electricity markets. Directive established common 
rules for generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. It further required EU 
member states to designate separate transmission and distribution system operators, 
meaning legal unbundling of the two activities. (2003/54/EC 2003) The second package 
also deemed all non-household customers eligible. Eligible consumers have the legal right 
to freely choose their supplier. (Meeus et al. 2005) 
 
The most recent and the most extensive energy package was introduced 2009. It continued 
from where the second package left to extend the national electricity market opening. The 
directive 2009/72/EC further continued efforts to unbundle different actors in electricity 
market. All customers were given right to choose their electricity provider and to change 
it easily within three weeks. In other words, all customers were deemed eligible. In 
addition, access to transmission system network was required to be granted to all third 
parties. National authorities were given rights to participate electricity undertakings but 
these activities were required to be kept separate from the transmission and distribution 
services. In other words, the aim was to unbundle energy production and supply interests 
from the network. Furthermore, one important point was to establish independent 
National Regulatory Authorities. Their role is to determine transmission and distribution 
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tariffs, cooperate in cross-border issues, monitor the transmission system operators and 
ensure user access to customer consumption data. (2009/72/EC 2009) 
 
South East Europe (SEE) regional integration started in 2002 with the Athens process, 
which target was to create regional SEE electricity market. This regional co-operation 
continued so that in 2006 the jurisdictions of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, Serbia and the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and European Community 
signed the Energy Community Treaty (EnCT). The main aim of the EnCT was to adopt 
EU energy targets in SEE countries. In addition, it aimed to establish common rules for 
the functions of the national electricity markets and for the safeguard methods of the 
national markets within the SEE region. EnCT also obligated the respective countries to 
setup a regional electricity market and open the national markets for all customers by 
2015. (2006/500/EC 2006, Karova 2011) Energy Community has evolved since the 
founding and currently also Ukraine and Moldova are its members and signatories of the 
EnCT. In addition, Croatia has left Energy Community since it joined European Union in 
2013. Lastly, Armenia, Georgia, Norway and Turkey are taking part as observers and 
Georgia is currently a candidate to become a full member of Energy Community. (Energy 
Community 2015) 
2.3 From bilateral markets to exchange markets 
The power market is currently dominated by two types of electricity market models: 
bilateral based trading and power exchange trading. Bilateral markets are more traditional 
way of organizing the electricity trades. However, power exchanges play crucial part in 
successful electricity market liberalization. 
2.3.1 Bilateral trading 
Traditionally predecessor of the regional electricity wholesale markets is bilateral 
electricity trading. In bilateral trading the electricity is traded directly between the 
supplier and the consumer. Thus, in this model there is no third party involvement. 
 
Three distinctive designs for bilateral trading can be identified. First of them is 
customized long-term contracts. With such contract the supplier and the consumer usually 
agree on a delivery of a large amount of electricity during a long period of time and thus 
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securing the amount of electricity needed for that time interval. Second option is over the 
counter trading, meaning usually short period delivery deals for smaller amounts of 
electricity which are typically based on a standardized contracts. The third option is 
electronic trading where the participants of the trading can place their willingness to buy 
or sell electricity to electrical marketplace. Then the marketplace system tries to match 
the offers and if no match occurs, the bids are left open in the marketplace waiting for 
better matching offers.  In all three described design methods the price is set 
independently by the parties involved in a trade. Also the details of the deals are not 
published, making the market less transparent. (Kirschen, Strbac 2004) 
 
Bulgarian market structure can be used as an example of a functioning bilateral market. 
The market is based on bilateral supply contracts and balancing power market. The 
bilateral market is further divided in regulated and non-regulated part. The regulated part 
is based on the contracts between the regulated customers, state owned public supplier 
and public providers. The prices in these contracts are regulated by Bulgarian   
independent   national regulation authority.  The non-regulated part is based on freely 
negotiable contracts between the eligible suppliers and consumers.  (Ganev 2009) 
 
In order to keep the balance in the transmission grid, the Bulgarian TSO has a role in this 
market model as Balance Market counterparty. The non-regulated part of the market 
needs to balance their real consumption or production to match their contractual delivery 
schedules. Producers who have generated less than agreed and consumers who have 
consumed more than agreed need to buy electricity from the TSO to correct their 
imbalance. The other way around, if produces have generated excess electricity or 
consumers have used less that what was agreed, they are required to sell electricity to the 
TSO. (Electricity System Operator 2006) The Bulgarian bilateral power market design is 
further illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
 16 
 
 
Figure 2. Bulgarian bilateral electricity market design. (Electricity System Operator 
2006) 
2.3.2 Power pools and exchanges 
The more modern and competitive electricity market designs are called electricity pools 
or electricity exchanges. In these designs, rather than agreeing for long term contracts 
directly between the supplier and the producer the trading is done in a centralized manner. 
In power pools the production and consumption are matched in a systematic way and it 
does not rely on single interactions between the suppliers and the consumers. The basic 
idea is that all supply offers are combined to aggregated supply curve and all demand 
offers are combined to aggregated demand curve. Then the mechanism used by the power 
pool (optimization algorithm) searches the intersection of these curves, also called as 
market equilibrium. All the supply offers which are priced equal or lower than the market 
equilibrium price are realized and similarly all the demand offers which are priced equal 
or higher than the market equilibrium price are realized. All suppliers are paid the same 
market equilibrium price and all consumers pay the same market equilibrium price. 
(Kirschen, Strbac 2004) 
 
Even though bilateral and power exchange market designs are very different, it should be 
noted that both can exist at the same time. Electricity market participants may decide to 
trade certain amount of their electricity needs in power exchange and trade some 
proportion with bilateral contracts. A good example of this it model presented in World 
Bank’s study showing that especially during transition period from bilateral trading to 
open exchange trading the eligible consumers and suppliers can have different layers of 
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contracts. The base load or base need is covered by bilateral contract with the public 
supplier, by own production and by non-regulated bilateral delivery contract. Then the 
rest of the trading is done in the power exchange (World Bank 2011). This trade layering 
is illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. Combining bilateral and power exchange trading. (World Bank 2011) 
 
Example of well-functioning power exchange based market design can be found from 
Nordics where Nord Pool Spot operates a physical power exchange. The so-called Nordic 
market model consists of four distinctive parts: financial market, day-ahead market, 
intraday market and balancing market. The financial market is used mainly for market 
participants’ risk managing purposes. In the financial markets, participants can trade with 
futures, forward and options. With these instruments they can hedge their trading amounts 
and secure certain price for their trades. Contracts can be made up to ten years in future. 
The financial market is operated by Nasdaq OMX. (Nord Pool Spot 2015a) 
 
The next two parts are operated by Nord Pool Spot. First part is day ahead market which 
is like the power exchange described earlier. The primary role of Day Ahead market is to 
establish equilibrium between the demand and the supply. Nord Pool Spot publishes price 
for each hour of the next coming day for each day of the year. To complement Day Ahead 
(DA) market, Nord Pool Spot also operates Intraday (ID) market. In this continuous 
market the trading takes place up to 30 minutes before the physical delivery. Therefore, 
Base load contract with public supplier 
Own production 
Non-regulated bilateral trade 
24 hours 
MW 
Hourly trade in 
electricity exchange 
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participants are able to balance their actual positions compared to the agreed positions 
earlier in the DA market. In other words, participants can buy more electricity from ID 
markets or sell excess to ID market to balance out their portfolios. (Nord Pool Spot 2015a) 
 
The final piece in the Nordic model is balancing market operated by the national TSOs. 
In the balancing power market the market actors can submit up-regulation or down-
regulation offers which are then activated by the TSO if the transmission system needs 
balancing. The main purpose of such balancing is to maintain stable frequency in the 
transmission network. (Fingrid 2015) 
2.3.3 Why exchange rather than bilateral market 
In bilateral markets the delivery contracts and deal negotiations are done independently 
between two parties. Therefore, in a way the bilateral markets are more flexible than the 
power exchange based markets. However, the negotiation process can be expensive and 
assessing the reliability of the counterparty can be risky. Exchanges provide security for 
market participants since it works as their counterparty for all traders and therefore 
mitigates the counterparty risk. Other advantages on exchange’s favor over bilateral 
trading are lower trading costs and increased competition. Since there are more actors in 
the market, it naturally increases the competition and forces market participants the use 
different kind of bidding strategies. Exchanges also produce publically observable price 
which can be used as price signal for further adjusting bidding strategies or electricity 
sector investments. It should also be noted that since exchanges work in standardized and 
efficient way, their trading is much faster and reliable in day to day level. (Stoft 2002) 
 
Other considerable aspects in favor of exchange based market design are enhancing 
investment on climate and transparency. In the Nordic electricity markets electricity is 
produced so that most affordable production methods are activated first. Different 
production methods are activated in merit price order one after another as long as the 
demand is met, this is illustrated in Figure 4. In other words, this market model tends to 
support more climate friendly production methods due to their lower marginal costs. On 
the other hand, in bilateral contracts producer and consumer agree only on the amount 
and price and thus does directly favor climate friendly generation methods. 
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Figure 4. Merit order of production. (Liski 2006, Suomen ElFi 2015) 
 
Transparency is one of the aspects EU legislation aims to improve in electricity markets. 
In line with that target, exchange market design provides more transparency to the 
markets. In the Nord Pool Spot’s markets the insider trading and market manipulation is 
permitted. In addition the operations of the exchange are explained publically stating how 
to price is calculated. Exchange also provides price-relevant information publically for 
everybody’s use. (Nord Pool Spot 2015c). 
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3 Overview of South East Europe electricity sector 
This study focuses on a particular set of countries in South East Europe. The set includes 
Albania (AL), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BA), Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), Montenegro 
(ME), Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia (RS) and Kosovo 
(XS). The country set which is researched in this study is chosen so that the countries do 
not have any existing major regional collaboration in electricity markets. Other SEE/CEE 
countries Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic and Slovakia already collaborate in 4M 
Market Coupling and Slovenia has market coupling with Italian power exchange GME. 
Thus, they are left out of the scope. In this chapter the electricity sectors of the selected 
jurisdictions are investigated closer and the most relevant electricity sector figures are 
presented.  
3.1 Electricity sector at regional level 
Final electricity consumption in selected countries has stayed pretty stable on the last 
three years. Final electricity consumption includes electricity used in transportation, 
industry and other end use sectors such as residential, services, forestry/agriculture and 
fishing. Serbia is the only jurisdiction which has notable decreased in their electricity 
consumption during the last few years. Opposite to that, Albania and Kosovo have slightly 
increased their consumption, keeping the total regional consumption around the same 
level throughout the last five years. The final electricity consumption in the selected South 
East Europe countries can be seen in the Figure 5. Total regional electricity consumption 
in 2013 was close to 102TWh. Data for the figure is acquired from Eurostat, except for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Final electricity consumption values for these two 
jurisdictions are extracted from Energy Community annual reports. It should be noted 
that the overall regional electricity consumption is quite low. As reference, electricity 
consumption only in Finland was around 82TWh in 2013 (Energiateollisuus 2014). 
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Figure 5. Regional development in electricity consumption. Data source: Eurostat, 
(Energy Community Secretariat 2012, Energy Community Secretariat 2014) 
 
Taking a closer look to year 2013, it can be seen that Bulgaria and Serbia are the main 
consumers of electricity in the region, illustrated in Figure 6. The yearly final electricity 
consumption in both two countries is around 27TWh, making them distinctively the 
biggest electricity consumers in the region. The next largest electricity consumers are 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina consuming yearly around 15TWh and 12TWh 
respectively. The least consuming group is formed by FYR of Macedonia, Albania, 
Montenegro and Kosovo. All of these jurisdictions have yearly final electricity 
consumption under 10TWh. Also the distribution losses are illustrated in the Figure 6. All 
of the jurisdictions have quite high distribution losses, Serbia standing out with almost 
twenty percent distribution losses compared to the final electricity consumption. High 
distribution losses imply that the power systems in the region are not in good state and 
investments are needed to bring the losses down. Again, if the distribution losses are 
compared to Finland where the losses were around 3% of yearly electricity consumption 
in 2013, it can clearly be seen that the losses are outstanding issue in SEE region 
(Energiateollisuus 2014).  
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Figure 6. Final electricity consumption and distribution losses in 2013. Data source: 
Eurostat, (Energy Community Secretariat 2012, Energy Community Secretariat 
2014) 
 
The selected region generates most of needed electricity with own installed generation 
capacity. Figure 7 shows the yearly electricity production per fuel type for each country. 
The regional total production is close to 135TWh. Most of the electricity is produced by 
two fuel types: coal and hydro. Majority of the yearly production of electricity, 
approximately 70TWh, is produced with coal-fired power plants. Next largest production 
cluster is hydro power plants, following with 42TWh yearly production. Bulgaria is the 
only country having nuclear power plants making it the sole producer of nuclear energy 
in the region. Nuclear powered production is covering 10,5% of region’s electricity 
production. Rest of the region’s electricity is generated by gas-fired power plants, 
renewable energy resources, oil-fired production and other production such as 
biomass/gas powered generation. The electricity production mix in the region is not quite 
versatile since almost 83% of all production is covered by coal and hydro power. In 
addition, electricity generation patterns are quite different in the different jurisdictions. 
Many of the jurisdictions rely only for either coal or hydro power. However, distinctive 
to other jurisdictions in the area, Bulgaria generates electricity with almost all possible 
power production possibilities.  
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Data for Figure 7 is constructed mainly from Eurostat database. Exception is made for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina of which data is from ENTSO-E database and Kosovo of which 
data is from Energy Community report assuming that 3% production was generated from 
hydropower (according to installed production capacities). 
 
 
Figure 7. Yearly electricity production per fuel type in 2013. Data source: Eurostat, 
ENTSO-E, (Energy Community Secretariat 2014) 
 
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) is 
association of European electricity transmission system operators mandated by European 
Union. The main tasks for ENTSO-E includes coordinated, reliable and secure operations 
of the interconnected network, helping development of integrated and transparent 
electricity markets, supporting network research and design work and give guidance to 
stakeholders. All other jurisdictions and their TSOs in the selected region expect Albania 
and Kosovo are members of ENTSO-E. They all are also are part of the synchronized 
network in central Europe. Albania is synchronously operated with the continental Europe 
but has not met all the strands to be accepted as ENTSO-E member. However, ENTSO-
E and Albania have agreement on permanent synchronous operation of Albanian and 
Continental Europe transmission systems. (ENTSO-E 2014b, ENTSO-E 2014a, ENTSO-
E 2014c) As mentioned, Kosovo is also not part of ENTSO-E. Kosovo’s transmission 
system operator KOSTT states that their primary objective is to join ENTSO-E but there 
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are some barriers in meeting the membership criteria and in cooperation with Serbian 
transmission system operator (KOSTT 2015). Therefore, Kosovo is included under 
Serbian control area in ENTSO-E provided data sources (World Bank 2011).  
 
Looking at the electricity flows between ENTSO-E countries it can be identified which 
jurisdictions are net importers and which are net exporters. It should be noted here that 
since Kosovo is not recognized as own network area by ENTSO-E, it does not have 
separate values. Instead, the electricity exchange from and to Serbia and Kosovo network 
area is presented as single value. The yearly total electricity exchange values from 2013 
and sum of total imports and exports per jurisdiction are presented in Table 1. Note that 
Greece, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia do not have import and export sums in Table 1 
since only electricity exchange between them and selected region is relevant for this 
study. As can be seen from the Table 1, Albania, Croatia and FYR of Macedonia are net 
importers of electricity whereas Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and 
Serbia and Kosovo network area are net exporters of electricity. Albania imports most of 
the electricity from Montenegro and in addition smaller amount from Greece. Albania 
also exports minor amount of electricity to Serbia and Kosovo network area. Majority of 
Croatia’s electricity imports are coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, 
Croatia imports also large amounts from other neighboring countries Hungary, Slovenia 
and Serbia and Kosovo network area. However, Croatia also exports considerable large 
amounts to Slovenia making it net exporter in their power trading. FYR of Macedonia 
imports electricity quite evenly from both Bulgaria and Serbia and Kosovo network area 
and also minor amount from Greece. All areas which have connections out of the selected 
region are exporting and importing with neighboring regions. Greece has cross-border 
trades with Albania, FYR of Macedonia and Bulgaria. Romania trades with Bulgaria and 
Serbia and Kosovo network area. Hungary has cross-border flows with Croatia and Serbia 
and Kosovo network area and finally Slovenia trades with Croatia. Total yearly electricity 
import to selected region was 10,45TWh in 2013 while yearly export from selected region 
was around 11TWh. Thus, the selected region was net exporter of electricity in 2013 with 
electricity mount of 0,57TWh. 
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Table 1. Yearly cross-border flows in GWh 2013. Data source: ENTSO-E 
FROM/TO AL BA BG GR HR HU ME FYROM RO RS SI Export 
AL    566   230   642  1438 
BA     4207  2117   541  6865 
BG    1746    2139 202 860  4947 
GR 729  5     54     
HR  1127    417    13 5207 6764 
HU     2911     278   
ME 1508 518        1316  3342 
FYROM   9 1490      36  1535 
RO   2912       973   
RS 83 1526 427  1563 952 666 1760 440   7417 
SI     2589        
Import 2320 3171 3353  11270  3013 3953  4659   
 
3.2 Local electricity field characteristics 
The net electricity production capacities per jurisdiction and hourly load curves for each 
jurisdiction are described in this chapter. This data is further used in the simulations 
performed in this study. Figure 8 shows the regional electricity production capacities in 
each country. In the SEE region hydro power capacity has the highest share in the total 
generation capacity amount since all of the jurisdictions have some amount of it. Total 
hydro capacity amount in the selected region is around 13,5GW and the majority of this 
capacity exist in Bulgaria and Serbia. The second largest generation capacity cluster 
consists of coal-fired power plants. The theoretical net production capacity with coal is 
close to 12GW. Similar to hydro generation capacity, almost all jurisdictions have some 
amount of coal-fired capacity. However, Albania does not any have fossil fuel power 
generation units except really minor (98MW) availability for oil-fired production. 
Instead, basically all Albanian production is based on the hydro generation. Gas-fired 
generation units are located mainly in Bulgaria, Serbia and Croatia. Nevertheless, the 
amount of gas-fired generation in the region is moderate. Only country possessing nuclear 
generation capacity is Bulgaria. Bulgaria has two nuclear power plant units totaling to 
2000MW production capacity (Bulgarian Energy Holding 2015b).  There is also some 
amount of renewable production is the region mainly containing wind, biofuel and solar 
generation units. 
 
 26 
 
Overall observation is that the region has quite good mix of different generation types per 
fuel. The situation is similar to Nord Pool Spot market area where there is good variety 
of different types of generation facilities. Figure 8 shows that the generation mix is very 
different in different jurisdictions. If each jurisdiction produces electricity independently 
without effective electricity exchange then the coordinated and effective activation of 
generation resources is challenging. However, large variety of different generation 
possibilities can efficiently be utilized within the regional electricity market. Thus, 
considering the generation structure in selected jurisdictions, there is great opportunity to 
improve the activation order of the generation units if they are considered as available 
resource units for whole area. 
 
 
Figure 8. Net maximum production capacity per fuel type at the end of 2013. Data 
source: ENTSO-E, (Energy Community Secretariat 2014) 
 
If the net maximum production capacity in the selected region is compared to the actual 
yearly production pattern which occurred in 2013, it can be seen the hydro and coal-fired 
production have changed the places. This can be indication of two things, firstly all of the 
hydro capacity cannot be fully utilized every day of the year. Secondly, since there is no 
market cooperation within the region, all of the hydro production is not necessarily 
utilized in the most efficient way. There also seems to be more gas-fired electricity 
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production potential than what was realized in 2013. This can potentially be explained by 
gas-fired co-generation (Combined Heat and Power generation) where all electricity 
potential is not used at the times when also heat is produced. 
 
In order to efficiently analyze demand side the averaged day approach is used in this 
study. Hourly load values were extracted from ENTSO-E database for all selected 
jurisdictions, these values show occurred demand for each hour of the year. Average for 
each hour of each month were calculated so that a typical day was identified for each 
month. These days are named from D1 to D12 in respect to the months and used as such 
further in this study. Naming convention is clarified in Table 2. Figure 9 illustrates the 
averaged 12 days, each representing a typical day in each month from January to 
December. It should again be noted that since Kosovo is not considered as own network 
area by ENTSO-E, Serbia and Kosovo is considered as one network area also in these 
figures. In addition, since Albania is not member of ENTSO-E its yearly consumption in 
2013 (according to Eurostat database) is divided evenly for all hours of the year creating 
a flat curve. The curves show that there is clearly seasonal and daily variation in demand 
amounts in all jurisdictions. During summer months less electricity is consumed whereas 
winter months are the peak demand months. Inside one day the peak hours occur during 
morning around 7:00 and then again at the evening around 19:00. The load curve profile 
is quite similar for all selected jurisdictions.  
 
Table 2. Naming of averaged days. 
Typical day in Naming convention 
January D1 
February D2 
March D3 
April D4 
May D5 
June D6 
July D7 
August D8 
September D9 
October D10 
November D11 
December D12 
 
 28 
 
In line with the yearly final electricity consumption illustrated earlier in Figure 6, also 
hourly consumption shows that Serbia and Kosovo network area and Bulgaria are the 
highest consumers in the region. Their yearly consumption varies quite much from 
2700MW to 6200MW. Montenegro, Albania and FYR of Macedonia are the smallest 
areas when it comes to hourly loads. Their values are varying from 200MW to 1200MW. 
Between these two consumption classes there are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia 
with hourly consumption levels between 1200MW and 2200MW. 
 
 
Figure 9. Hourly and seasonal variation of consumption in 2014. Data source: 
ENTSO-E, Eurostat 
  
200
1200
2200
3200
4200
5200
6200
0
1
:0
0
0
9
:0
0
1
7
:0
0
0
1
:0
0
0
9
:0
0
1
7
:0
0
0
1
:0
0
0
9
:0
0
1
7
:0
0
0
1
:0
0
0
9
:0
0
1
7
:0
0
0
1
:0
0
0
9
:0
0
1
7
:0
0
0
1
:0
0
0
9
:0
0
1
7
:0
0
0
1
:0
0
0
9
:0
0
1
7
:0
0
0
1
:0
0
0
9
:0
0
1
7
:0
0
0
1
:0
0
0
9
:0
0
1
7
:0
0
0
1
:0
0
0
9
:0
0
1
7
:0
0
0
1
:0
0
0
9
:0
0
1
7
:0
0
0
1
:0
0
0
9
:0
0
1
7
:0
0
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12
HOURLY DEMAND 
(MW)
Montenergro Albania FYR of Macedonia
Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia Bulgaria
Serbia and Kosovo
 29 
 
4 Current state of market opening in SEE region 
There are three main dimensions for the electricity market opening status: degree of 
vertical unbundling, degree of horizontal unbundling and finally eligibility threshold and 
overall market openness. In this chapter, the latest statuses of these dimensions are given 
for each selected jurisdiction. Firstly, the degree of the vertical unbundling of the state-
owned energy enterprise is observed. Vertical unbundling means legally separating 
different parts of the electricity market operations such as transmission, distribution, 
exchange and regulatory operations. Secondly, the degree of the horizontal unbundling is 
researched i.e. how well the state owned generation capacity is privatized. Lastly, the 
overall market openness is studied focusing on the eligibility threshold and the state of 
establishing an electricity exchange. 
4.1 Albania 
As shown in previous chapter, the electricity sector in Albania is relatively small. The 
electricity transmission system in Albania is operated by fully state-owned company 
OST. OST was created and legally separated from Albanian Power Corporation in 2004 
as part of the vertical unbundling process. OST is also responsible for dispatching and 
market operations in Albania. (OST 2015) 
 
Even though OST and its activities are separated from other energy sector activities, the 
legal unbundling of network operations is not included in Albanian power sector law. In 
addition, Albanian distribution company OSHEE is not functionally unbundled to 
separated supply and distribution activities. In fact, OSHEE is functioning both as 
distribution system operator and as public retail supplier in Albania. Due to these reasons, 
the vertical unbundling process in Albania is still uncompleted and requires restructuring 
of OSHEE and updates to the power sector law. Also horizontal unbundling in Albania is 
not accomplished. The wholesale market is monopolized by state-owned company KESh 
which owns majority of Albanian generation capacity. (Energy Community Secretariat 
2014)  
 
In Albanian market model KESh is required to provide ancillary services needed to 
maintain grid security and power balance. KESh is also functioning as Wholesale Public 
Supplier. Therefore, all the generation is agreed by annual contracts and fixed prices 
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regulated by Albanian regulatory authority ERE and sold to KESh. There are also so 
called small power producers (SPP) and independent power producers (IPP) in the 
Albanian market model. The difference between them is that SPPs are connected to 
distribution network while IPPS are connected directly to the transmission network. SPPs 
are allowed to trade with qualified suppliers, traders and distribution system operator with 
freely negotiated terms. Therefore this trading is bilateral based. In addition, small power 
producers are allowed to sell directly to the wholesale public supplier KESh with 
regulated price. IPPs have similar rights to sell to OST, eligible customers, qualified 
suppliers or traders at freely negotiated prices and with regulated prices to KESh. (Enti 
Rregullator i Energjise 2015) Nevertheless, since KESh owns the majority of the 
generation capacity in Albania, the share of the free market and the role of the SPPs and 
IPPs is currently really minor. However, this situation may change in near future since 
Devoll Hydropower and Statkraft are contracting a project of building a 256MW hydro 
power plant in Albania. This will increase Albanian electricity production by 17 percent 
and increase the IPPs market share significantly when fully operational in 2018 (Devoll 
Hydropower 2015). 
 
Albanian regulator ERE grants eligibility status based on the annual consumption levels. 
Thus, only few large customers have acquired eligibility status giving them right and 
obligation to contract their supply outside of the regulated system. For the customers not 
having the eligibility status granted by ERE, the market is foreclosed on the wholesale 
and retail level due to the monopoly statuses of KESh and OSHEE. There is no power 
exchange or other liquid market place in operation in Albania. In addition, there is no 
daily auctions for cross-border trades between Albania and Kosovo. Instead, all the cross-
border trading happens in pro-rata basis. However, ENTSO-E allowed Albania to join 
central Europe synchronized transmission network and Albania also joined SEE 
Coordinated Auction Office (SEE CAO) which aims to have joint capacity allocation for 
the whole region. (Energy Community Secretariat 2014) 
 
Albania aims to have liberalized wholesale markets function by the year 2018. As part of 
this process, Albania will adopt new energy laws in 2015 to adapt the market model which 
is in line with the 3rd EU energy package requirements. (Mediterranean Energy Regulators 
2015) Furthermore, Albania joined SEE Coordinated Auction Office early 2015 and thus 
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capacity between Albania and Montenegro is now included in SEE CAO monthly auction 
process. (SEE CAO 2015) In addition, Albania and Kosovo have plans to create common 
market for electricity. These plans are elaborated further in this study in chapter 4.6. 
4.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The jurisdiction of Bosnia and Herzegovina is split into two autonomous entities: the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. (Central Intelligence 
Agency 2015a) This division is also reflected to the energy sector of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The state level legislative authority belongs to the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Relations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, both entities have 
also their own institutions for energy governance: Federal Electricity Regulatory 
Commission and Regulatory Commission for Energy of Republika Srpska. Electricity 
production, distribution and supply activities are governed by the two entities in their 
respective areas, whereas transmission and regulation activities are governed at state 
level. Due to the split in the political level, there has been difficulties in state level 
cooperation and in the energy sector reform in recent years. State Electricity Regulatory 
Commission functions as state level regulatory authority but does not have power over 
the whole energy sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina and therefore has to cooperate with 
entity level regulatory authorities. (Energy Community Secretariat 2014) 
 
The unbundling and market reform process in Bosnia and Herzegovina is behind its 
neighboring countries. Law of establishing independent transmission system operator was 
adopted already 2004 at state level. Independent System Operator in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (ISO BiH) was established in respect to the new law. However, the 
transmission activities are still split between ISO BiH and Elektroprenos BiH. ISO BiH 
is responsible for dispatching and balancing activities and allocation of the cross-border 
capacities whereas Elektroprenos BiH owns the transmission network and is in charge of 
connections, transmission, metering, maintenance and development of the infrastructure. 
Furthermore, the Energy Community report indicates that transmission investments and 
independent decision making have not been effective which further questions the 
effectiveness of the unbundling of the transmission activities. (Energy Community 
Secretariat 2014) 
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Unbundling of the distribution operations is not realized in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina distribution operations are handled by two 
vertically integrated enterprises EP BiH and EP HZHB. Same companies are also 
responsible for supply and power generation operations in the respective entity area. 
Similarly, in the Republika Srpska the distribution activities are carried out by ERS 
enterprise subsidiaries and remains both legally and functionally bundled with their 
supply operations. However, in Republika Srpska the generation activities of ERS are 
legally unbundled from their distribution and supply services. (Energy Community 
Secretariat 2014) 
 
Also granting eligibility status to all customers in Bosnia and Herzegovina is still not 
accomplished.  Regulatory Commission for electricity of Republic of Srpska has stated 
that from the beginning of 2015 all customers are eligible and can freely choose the 
supplier from whom they will buy electricity. However, the electricity prices will still 
remain regulated (Regulatory Commission for electricity of Republic of Srpska 2015) . 
In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina eligibility status is granted at entity level. 
In theory, the wholesale market functions at bilateral and over-the-counter basis. 
However, there is no real competition in the markets and it lacks liquid trading platform 
for electricity. The number of the generation companies representing at least 95% of the 
national generation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was only two in 2013. In addition, 
electricity consumers mainly have to choose their local producer as their supplier. 
(Eurostat 2015a) 
4.3 Bulgaria 
Bulgarian energy sector and domestic market is highly concentrated around the Bulgarian 
Energy Holding (BEH) Company. It is state owned company originating from Bulgarian 
Oil and Gas Company established already in 1973. During recent years the company has 
split even more to amend the EU energy legislation. BEH has also a daughter company 
NEK which is the national electricity supply company and owns around 45% of the all 
installed capacity in Bulgaria. Anyhow, the legal vertical unbundling in Bulgaria has 
progressed well. In 2013 NEK terminated its electricity transmission activities and 
Electricity System Operator (ESO) applied for the role of electricity system operator. In 
2014 the last phase of the split between NEK and ESO was completed and ESO became 
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the legally unbundled owner of the Bulgarian transmission grid. ESO is also full member 
of ENTSO-E. In addition, the distribution network has been privatized and is owned by 
CEZ, EVN and Energo-Pro. Therefore, the distribution and supply activities in Bulgaria 
are legally unbundled. However, ESO is still fully owned by BEH. Furthermore, as part 
of vertical unbundling process BEH group licensed its subsidiary Bulgaria Energy 
Exchange (IBEX) to be able to operate organized power exchange and Day Ahead market 
in Bulgaria. Bulgarian energy sector is regulated by independent authority State Energy 
and Water Regulatory Commission (SEWRC), which was established already 1999. The 
electricity market in Bulgaria is regulated based on the Electricity Trading Rules and the 
newest version of them was applied in 2013 to meet the requirements of the EU’s third 
liberalization package. Thus, the new amendments to the rules meet all the perquisites for 
establishment of working Day Ahead market by IBEX. (Bulgarian Energy Holding 
2015a, European Commission 2014a, State Energy and Water Regulatory Commission 
2014) 
 
Market opening in Bulgaria has also been progressing already for several years. In 2007 
all consumers became eligible, resulting in theoretical full market liberalization. The 
current Bulgarian market model includes methods to trade electricity. In the first method 
electricity is traded at regulated prices approved by SEWRC and in the other one 
electricity is traded in liberalized electricity markets bilaterally. The bilateral contracts 
are freely negotiated between the parties on the markets. The liberalized part of the market 
was opened in 2013 and it covers about third of the trade, including mainly consumers 
connected to the transmission network. However, the Bulgarian market is highly 
concentrated and in 2012 just 33 percent of the market participants covered 92 percent 
share of the whole markets. Bulgaria also has active cross-border trading with 
neighboring areas where the cross-border capacity is allocated and agreed bilaterally 
between the auction operators of the neighboring systems. (European Commission 2014a, 
State Energy and Water Regulatory Commission 2014, Ganev 2009) 
 
Early 2015 Nord Pool Spot and IBEX announced that Bulgaria will further develop their 
power markets by launching a competitive Day Ahead power market in Bulgaria. IBEX 
shall develop a transparent and efficient power markets where Nord Pool Spot will work 
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as their partner to deliver the required trading systems. The planned launch of market 
operations is by the end of Q4 2015. (Nord Pool Spot 2015b) 
4.4 Croatia 
Similar to Bulgaria, also Croatia’s energy sector has been concentrated around state 
owned energy holding company, which has been unbundled to separate operations during 
recent years. HEP Group was engaged in all electricity market activities being production, 
transmission, distribution, supply and trade. However, in recent years the legal 
unbundling of aforementioned activities has been carried out, except for distribution and 
supply. In 2013, transmission activities were unbundled from HEP Group when Croatian 
Transmission System Operator (HOPS) was established. HOPS equity capital was 
increased and founding acts amended to strengthen the unbundling from HEP.  Electricity 
distribution and supply activities are carried out by Croatian distribution system operator 
HEP-ODS. Same company also provides electricity supply as public service. Since HEP-
ODS is owned by HEP Group and distribution and supply are not unbundled, the vertical 
unbundling in Croatia is still ongoing process. (Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency 
2014, European Commission 2014b, Energy Community Secretariat 2013) 
 
Croatian energy regulatory authority HERA was established already 2004 and it is 
regulating the energy sector independently. The newest energy law was adopted in 
Croatia in 2012 which aims to align their national legislation with the EU third energy 
package. In addition, as part of Croatian energy sector reform Croatian energy market 
operator HROTE was established in 2005 by HEP-Group and later transferred to Croatian 
state in 2007. HROTEs main responsibility is to organize electricity and gas markets as 
public service and therefore it is operating under supervision of HERA (Croatian Energy 
Regulatory Agency 2014, Energy Community Secretariat 2013). In order to facilitate 
open electricity market and Day Ahead electricity auctions, HROTE and HOPS co-
founded CROPEX power exchange in 2014 (Trhulj 2014). Mid 2015 CROPEX further 
announced that they have signed Cooperation Agreement with Nord Pool Spot to create 
first competitive Croatian day-ahead power market. By creating an efficient Croatian 
power market, Croatia aims to join the pan-European multiregional coupling of power 
markets. Nord Pool Spot will function as CROPEX’s partner to operate the market. 
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Communicated start date for market operations is the end of the fourth quarter of 2015. 
(CROPEX 2015)   
 
Currently, Croatian markets are functioning at bilateral basis and the prices are freely 
negotiable. However, the competition in the market is very limited. The generation sector 
is dominated by HEP-Group and it was the biggest generator in 2012 with 82% market 
share. Another bigger producer is TE Plomin d.o.o which is co-owned by RWE and HEP. 
Still at the end of 2013, 95 percent of the generation capacity in Croatia was owned just 
by two companies. Croatia also actively performs cross-border trading and HOPS is one 
of the co-owners of SEE Coordinated Auction Office. Cross-border capacity auctioning 
with Hungary and Slovenia is conducted by SEE CAO whereas capacity allocation with 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia is done via daily auctions. (Croatian Energy 
Regulatory Agency 2014) Eligibility in Croatia is well adopted and Croatian legislation 
states that all customers are eligible and free to choose their supplier. (Energy Community 
Secretariat 2013) 
4.5 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
Energy sector reform in FYR of Macedonia has proceeded relatively well. The base for 
the reform is Energy Law from 2011. In terms of vertical unbundling process, FYR of 
Macedonia has independent transmission system operator, Electricity Transmission 
System Operator of Macedonia (MEPSO), which is fully state owned company 
established in 2005. MEPSO’s existence is also required by law, in line with the Third 
Energy Package. (Energy Community Secretariat 2014) However, unbundling of 
distribution and supply activities has not yet taken place. There are two companies 
operating in this field, ELEM and EVN Makedonija. Majority of the distribution system 
and activities are handled by EVN which owns close to 99,5% of the physical network 
whereas ELEM owns the rest around 0,5% of the network. Both of them supply to 
customers at regulated prices. (Energy Regulatory Commission of the Republic of 
Macedonia 2015) 
 
Since the beginning of 2015 all customers have been eligible in FYR of Macedonia. 
However, the market is dominated by ELEM which is responsible for 91 percent of all 
electricity generation in the country. Rest of the supply is from unregulated domestic 
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producers, small hydroelectric power plants and photovoltaic power plants. The second 
phase of the electricity market liberalization in FYR of Macedonia started early 2014 and 
all customers expect households and small non-households were required to purchase 
electricity through tender procedure. However, most of the customers failed to find 
supplier before the end of 2014. Therefore, FYROM’s regulatory authority, Energy 
Regulatory Commission (ERC) obligated ELEM and EVN to provide electricity as public 
service to those not landing in supply agreements through tenders. ECR approximated 
that their electricity market liberalization percentage was around 45% at the end of 2014. 
(Energy Regulatory Commission of the Republic of Macedonia 2015) 
 
The electricity market in FYR of Macedonia is divided into two parts, unregulated and 
regulated. The regulated part concerns mostly ELEM and MEPSO and thus the majority 
of the market. The price which ELEM uses to sell electricity is regulated by ECR. 
Therefore, most of the electricity market in FYR of Macedonia is price regulated. The 
unregulated part of the market concerns mostly eligible consumers and other electricity 
generators, suppliers and traders. They can sell and purchase electricity at freely 
negotiated prices with own choice and risk. (Energy Regulatory Commission of the 
Republic of Macedonia 2015) FYR of Macedonia is working towards the market opening 
and new electricity market rules, tariff system and purchase rules to cover network losses 
became into force in 2014. In addition, the distribution grid code was updated. (European 
Commission 2014d) 
 
FYR of Macedonia is trading with its neighboring areas and cross-border capacities are 
allocated through yearly, monthly, weekly and intra-day auctions. The cross-border 
capacities are divided half between FYR of Macedonia and each neighboring area. 
Taxation issues have prevented MEPSO to join SEE Coordinated Auction Office. 
(Energy Community Secretariat 2014) Slovenian power exchange BSP South Pool 
released news already in 2009 about plans to co-operate with FYR of Macedonia to 
establish trading infrastructure on their electricity markets. (BSP SouthPool 2009) 
However, there are no recent news of this project or progress of establishment of a 
functional power exchange in FYR of Macedonia. 
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4.6 Kosovo 
Kosovo jurisdiction is slightly different from the other jurisdictions discussed in this 
study. Kosovo declared its independency and separation from Serbia in 2008 but Serbia 
has not recognized Kosovo’s independency yet and treats it as autonomous area. 
However, over 100 other United Nations countries have recognized Kosovo and since 
2013 Kosovo and Serbia has committed making progress between their relationships. 
(Central Intelligence Agency 2015b) The political situation naturally also affects the 
energy sector and the electricity market opening process. 
 
The Ministry of Economic Development in Kosovo is responsible for energy sector 
legislation and is in progress to transpose European Union third energy package content 
into their Law on Energy, Law on Electricity and Law on Energy Regulator. Electricity 
sector activities are divided into three main companies; Kosovo Energy Corporation 
(KEK) is the public electricity generator in the jurisdiction, KOSTT operates as 
transmission system operator and Kosovo Electricity Distribution and Supply (KEDS) is 
responsible for the distribution operations. Furthermore, the energy sector is regulated by 
single authority Energy Regulatory Office (ERO). (Energy Community Secretariat 2014) 
ERO’s independence status is doubted due to the intervention and interference by 
Kosovo’s government. (European Commission 2014c) 
 
KOSTT is fully unbundled in theory. However, KOSTT has been included in the control 
area of the Serbian transmission system operator EMS. Thus, KOSTT has not been able 
to allocate cross-border capacities nor handle congestion management. Long-term cross-
border capacities with neighboring areas have been allocated through SEE Coordinated 
Auction Office. (Energy Community Secretariat 2014) Late 2014 KOSTT and EMS 
signed Operational Agreement which regulates the bilateral relations regarding the 
operations of the two transmission system operators and their network areas. This 
agreement separated Kosovo to independent network and trading area operated by 
KOSTT. (KOSTT 2014) 
 
Distribution and supply activities remain bundled in Kosovo. KEDS is still operating in 
both fields, even though it has namely separated these activities into two different internal 
divisions. All customers became eligible in Kosovo at the beginning of 2015. (European 
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Commission 2014c) However, the ability to switch supplier is still theoretical in Kosovo 
due to the lack in competition. The electricity market is fully regulated and KEK is 
obligated by law to provide KEDS the required amount of electricity which further 
delivers it to the end customers with regulated prices. In addition, all producers with over 
5MW capacity are obligated to sell their electricity to KEDS. Further market opening is 
also seen difficult since there is not enough liquidity in Kosovo’s markets in order to 
facilitate efficient competition. (Energy Community Secretariat 2014) However, Kosovo 
and Albania are planning to establish common energy market with common market area 
to overcome the lack of production capacity. They see that their power systems are 
complementary since Albania has lot of hydro production whereas Kosovo has coal-fired 
conventional production. In order to facilitate this project Kosovan and Albanian 
Governments have established joint Steering Committee and signed Memory of 
Understanding on creation of the common market. In addition, Albanian TSO (ERE) and 
ERO have agreement of understanding for the project, as well as Albanian TSO (OST) 
and KOSTT have inter TSO agreement. Furthermore, KEK and KESH from Albania, the 
main producers, have agreement on electricity exchange. (Ministry of Economic 
Development of Kosovo 2015, Bejtullahu 2014) 
4.7 Montenegro 
Energy law in Montenegro is from 2010. Since 2013 Montenegro has started to transpose 
Third Energy Package content as amendments to their legislation. The Energy Regulatory 
Authority of Montenegro (RAE) functions as regulator in the jurisdiction. RAE has 
legally independent status and has also financial independence. However, Montenegro 
parliament approves RAE’s annual reports which allows some level of political 
intervention. (Energy Community Secretariat 2014) 
 
Unbundling process in Montenegro has been done only for transmission activities. CGES 
is functioning as transmission system operator in Montenegro and it is owned 55% by 
state, 22% by Italian TSO TERNA and rest is owned by investment funds and other legal 
entities. CGES is legally unbundled from any other activities. (CGES 2015) However, 
distribution, supply and power generation are all still bundled in Montenegro’s biggest 
energy utility EPCG. EPCG’s main owners are state of Montenegro with 55% share and 
Italian utility company A2A with 44% share. Rest of the ownership is divided between 
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other physical and legal entities. (EPCG 2015) EPCG has proceeded with the unbundling 
by separating distribution, supply and generation activities to three different functional 
units and by unbundling the accounting for each of them. However, since both EPCG and 
CGES have the state of Montenegro as their main owner, the unbundling will require 
further efforts to spread the share of ownership. (Energy Community Secretariat 2014) 
RAE has stated that legal unbundling of EPCG is one of its main objectives during 2015 
and they are planning to be intensively engaged in monitoring of the implementation of 
the separation process. (The Energy Regulatory Agency of Montenegro 2014) 
 
All non-household customers are eligible in Montenegro. In addition, there are plans to 
complete market opening by allowing all customers to be eligible during 2015. (Energy 
Community Secretariat 2014) The final step for full market opening has been postponed 
to latter half of 2015 since the unbundling of EPCG is not yet done and thus there is not 
enough competition for the supply activities. (Prekic 2015) Fully state owned company 
COTEE is functioning as market operator in Montenegro. The electricity prices for 
customers connected to transmission network are not regulated. However, the amount of 
suppliers at this level is very limited and the amount of customers connected directly to 
the transmission network is also small. Customers connected to the distribution network 
have to purchase their electricity using prices regulated by RAE. The price regulation is 
following European Electricity Exchange (EEX) Phelix baseload settlement price. In 
addition to the two aforementioned prices, also the electricity price for non-eligible 
customers is regulated and the electricity is provided by EPCG as public service. (Energy 
Community Secretariat 2014) 
 
CGES’s was approved to SEE CAO and starting from mid-2015 Montenegro – Albania 
cross-border allocation will be handled through CAO. (SEE CAO 2015) Rest of the 
interconnection capacities are divided half between the neighboring countries and remain 
to be allocated through annual, monthly and daily auctions. (Energy Community 
Secretariat 2014) In addition, The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) 
accepted RAE as observer party to their cooperation council early 2014. (CEER 2014) 
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4.8 Serbia 
Serbian energy sector is based on the energy law from 2011. The Energy Law was 
renewed at the end of 2014 by modifications to conditions for electricity and natural gas 
public supply entitlement. In addition, it includes legislation for staged electricity market 
opening. The Energy Agency (AERS) is the single authority in Serbia regulating the 
energy sector. (Energy Community Secretariat 2014) 
 
Currently, the legal vertical unbundling of electricity sector activities is progressing well. 
Serbian transmission system operator Elektromreza Srbije (EMS) is legally unbundled 
and responsible for transmission activities. However, EMS is fully state owned company. 
Also Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS) is fully state owned enterprise, operating in the fields 
of distribution, supply and generation. (Energy Community Secretariat 2014) In 2013 
EPS started to unbundle its activities and created legally separate company EPS Supply 
to take care of the supply activities. (Energy Agency of the Republic of Serbia 2015a) In 
addition, recently in 2015 EPS continued the unbundling process and announced the 
creation of legally separate distribution company EPS Distribution. EPS also announced 
plans to transition from public state owned enterprise into stock company at the summer 
of 2016. (Electric Power Industry of Serbia 2015) Therefore, the unbundling process in 
Serbia is technically completed. Furthermore, the horizontal unbundling process has been 
started. 
 
All customers have been eligible in Serbia since the beginning of 2015.  However, 
households and small customers are still entitled to public supply at regulated prices if 
they wish so. Due to the eligibility statuses, all customers in Serbia need to conclude 
supply contract at market prices. If they fail to find a supplier, EPS Supply will function 
as a public supplier and provide electricity at regulated prices to them. (Energy Agency 
of the Republic of Serbia 2015b) Serbian electricity market consists of bilateral electricity 
market, balancing market and organized electricity market. EMS functions as market 
operator in Serbia. In the bilateral part of the market, participants can trade electricity at 
freely negotiated prices. However, EPS has dominant positions in the markets. (Energy 
Agency of the Republic of Serbia 2015a) Mid 2015 EPEX Spot announced that together 
with EMS they will launch Serbian Day-Ahead market by the end of November 2015. 
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South Eastern European Power Exchange (SEEPEX) will be compatible with current 
Pan-European market coupling model. (EPEX Spot 2015) 
 
Currently, EMS is not part of SEE Coordinated Auction Office. Instead, Serbia allocates 
the available transmission capacity between neighboring areas through joint explicit 
auctions on yearly, monthly, daily and intra-daily basis. However, in 2014 AERS created 
action plan considering joining coordinated congestion management. (Energy Agency of 
the Republic of Serbia 2015a) 
4.9 Summary of current situation 
In order to gain a clear overview on the situations in the selected jurisdictions, the 
aforementioned statuses on the vertical and horizontal unbundling, eligibility threshold 
and market openness are gathered into the following Tables 3, 4 and 5. 
 
Table 3. Status of vertical unbundling. 
 Transmission operations Distribution and supply 
Albania OST legally unbundled but 
fully state-owned. 
Not unbundled. OSHEE 
responsible for both. Legal 
unbundling not part of 
Albanian legislation. 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Partially unbundled. ISO 
BiH responsible for 
dispatching, balancing and 
allocating the cross-border 
capacities.  
 
Elektroprenos BiH owns the 
transmission network and in 
charge of connections, 
transmission, metering, 
maintenance and 
development of the 
infrastructure. 
Not unbundled.  
 
EP BiH and EP HZHB 
responsible for both 
distribution and supply 
activities in Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
ERS subsidiaries 
responsible for both in 
Republika Srpska. 
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Bulgaria ESO legally unbundled Legally unbundled. NEK 
responsible for supply. 
CEZ, EVN and Energy-
Pro responsible for 
distribution. 
Croatia HOPS legally unbundled Not unbundled. Both 
activities done by HEP-
ODS 
FYR of Macedonia MEPSO legally unbundled 
but fully state owned. 
Not unbundled. EVN 
owns 99,5% of the 
distribution network. 
ELEM owns the rest. Both 
also involved in supply 
activities. 
Kosovo KOSTT legally unbundled. 
Late 2014 KOSTT and 
EMS signed operation 
agreement for KOSTT’s 
independent operations in 
Kosovo.  
Not legally unbundled. 
KEDS involved in both 
activities. KEDS has 
separate divisions for 
distribution and supply 
activities. 
Montenegro CGES legally unbundled. 
55% owned by state 
Not legally unbundled. 
EPCG still active in both 
fields. EPCG has separated 
functions to different units. 
Serbia EMS legally unbundled but 
fully state owned. 
Legally unbundled. EPS 
Distribution and EPS 
Supply functioning in their 
own fields. 
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Table 4. Status of horizontal unbundling and eligibility threshold. 
 Horizontal unbundling Eligibility 
Albania Market monopolized by 
state-owned company 
KESh. 
All non-household 
customers. However, 
based on voltage level or 
annul consumption and 
status granted by ERE. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina The electricity market in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
heavily concentrated and 
customers mostly need to 
rely on their local 
producers. 
In Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina dealt 
exclusively on entity 
level. 
 
In Republika Srpska all 
customers from beginning 
of the 2015. 
Bulgaria NEK owns 45% of all 
installed capacity. In 2012 
33% of market participants 
had 92% share of whole 
market. 
All customers eligible. 
Croatia State owned HEP-Group 
had 82% market share in 
2012. In 2013 95% of the 
generation capacity owned 
by two companies. 
All customers eligible. 
FYR of Macedonia ELEM responsible for 
91% of all electricity 
generation. 
All customers eligible. 
Kosovo KEK has dominant 
position in the market. 
All customer eligible. But 
no real choice for other 
supplier than KEDS. 
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Montenegro EPCG has dominant 
position in the market. 
All non-household 
customers. Plans to grant 
status for all during 2015.  
Serbia Fully state owned EPS 
company responsible for 
generation but 
transitioning into public 
stock company in 2016. 
All customers eligible. 
 
Table 5. Status of market opening and power exchange. 
 Electricity market and trade status 
Albania Plans to amend Third Energy Package to Energy Law 
during 2015. Aim to have liberalized wholesale market 
by the end of 2020. Joined SEE CAO early 2015. Trade 
mostly at regulated prices. Plans to create common 
market between Albania and Kosovo. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Wholesale market mainly functioning on bilateral and 
over-the-counter basis. Lacking liquid trading platform.  
Bulgaria In 2013 third of the trade in liberalized markets. IBEX 
and Nord Pool Spot working towards Day-Ahead power 
market planned to be in operation Q4 2015. 
Croatia Market functioning on bilateral basis and prices are 
freely negotiable. CROPEX and Nord Pool Spot 
working towards Day-Ahead power market planned to 
be in operation at the end of Q4 2015  
FYR of Macedonia Most of the market still regulated because of ELEM’s 
dominant position. Eligible customers can trade at freely 
negotiated prices. New electricity market rules came 
into force in 2014.  
Kosovo Low amount of available generation resources in the 
area. Fully regulated market where KEK is obligated to 
provide KEDS the required electricity. Also smaller 
producers with over 5MW capacity need to sell to KEK. 
 45 
 
Kosovo and Albania planning to create common energy 
market to increase liquidity pool. 
Montenegro COTEE functioning as market operator. Prices for 
customers connected to the transmission network not 
regulated. Customers connected to distribution network 
have to purchase their electricity at regulated prices. 
Price for non-eligible customers regulated and the 
electricity provided by EPCG as public service. 
Serbia EMS functioning as market operator. EPS has dominant 
position but all participants can trade with freely 
negotiable prices. EMS and EPEX Spot working 
towards Day-Ahead power market, SEEPEX, planned to 
be in operation at the end of 2015. 
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5 Regional power market  
As part of the regional electricity market opening process, establishment of a regional 
power market is natural and beneficial step. In this chapter the importance and benefits 
of the regional power markets are explained. In addition, an overview to the optimal 
market model for SEE area is given. 
5.1 Integration dimensions 
Regional integration can be divided into three dimensions: infrastructural, regulatory and 
commercial integration. In order to fully integrate a well-functioning regional power 
market, all of the integration dimensions should be in place. Fully integrated 
infrastructure means that there is regional transmission system in operation and the areas 
in region are well interconnected. Opposite to this are isolated national power systems or 
some minor cross-border transmission capacity allocation. Fully integrating infrastructure 
naturally requires cooperation between national TSOs and some investments in the 
transmission system to allow sufficient electricity flows between the areas. In addition, 
infrastructural integration includes coordinated transmission and investment planning. 
The second dimension, regulatory integration, requires regional regulatory agency. This 
means shifting from independent national level regulation to centralized decision making 
and regulation for electricity sector. The centralized regulation should cover standards, 
market rules and market surveillance. (Pineau et al. 2004)  
 
The third dimension of regional market integration is commercial integration. When 
integrating commercial aspects the jurisdictions need to move from national markets with 
local ownership structures to cross border trading and further to regional spot markets. 
This dimension especially includes designing regional market where the electricity can 
be traded. To achieve this goal, also some level of harmonization of the market rules 
between national power exchanges need to happen. Full commercial integration can also 
gain benefits from an open regional financial market which can facilitate the risk 
management in the electricity markets. (Pineau et al. 2004)  
5.2 Benefits and effectiveness of regional power market 
Multiple benefits can be gained from integrated power markets. For this study four 
distinctive benefits are introduced and first one of them is specialization and exchange in 
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integrated markets. When the markets are fully integrated, it is possible to generate 
electricity anywhere within the region where the marginal costs for production are least 
and thus leading many times to environmental friendly production. Full integration also 
provides more security when higher level of fuel diversification can be gained due to the 
wider and integrated transmission network. The second distinctive benefit is the reduction 
of the market power of single market participants. In small national markets big 
generators often have ability to dominate the market and determine the price level. 
However, since there usually are multiple actors and several big generators in the 
integrated electricity markets, also the market power is much more evenly balanced. The 
third distinctive benefit is improved economic signals for the market. Regional power 
market is able to provide transparent and reliable area prices for electricity in the region, 
which further can be used to evaluate electricity sector investments. Fourth benefit 
connects to commercial integration. When full commercial integration has been 
accomplished, there is less need for national level institutions. Therefore, regional power 
market can reduce costs generated by many layers of institutions performing similar tasks 
within the region. (Pineau et al. 2004, Price, Pham 2009, Karova 2011) 
 
These four explained benefits are the main impact areas of closer integration in power 
markets. However, together they can further have effect on other aspects of the markets 
and electricity sector. One such follow-up effect can be cost reductions in many parts of 
electricity sector. With full commercial and infrastructure integration, the cross-border 
trading becomes easier and more economical. Thus, the one cost reduction object can be 
the transaction costs for electricity traders. Secondly, the full infrastructural integration 
and joint planning among the TSOs leads to more efficient capacity allocation and joint 
grid operations, reducing operational costs. In addition, creating joint and cooperated 
institutions for market activities naturally eliminates the overheard costs created by 
otherwise required duplicate institutions. (Price, Pham 2009) 
 
The effect of the full integration might have two-sided effect on the market prices. 
Assuming that also the infrastructural integration is in place and that the electricity can 
flow freely in the interconnected network, then prices try to balance out in the area. This 
means that the electricity importing (deficit) areas might now see lower electricity prices 
whereas the exporting (excess) areas may see prices going up. However, even though the 
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price might rise in excess areas, the excess area might still gain more benefits since they 
have opportunity to specialize and take advantage in their electricity generation and 
grown activity on electricity export business. (Price, Pham 2009) 
 
Transmission security is also one of the important benefits resulting from the electricity 
market integration. A good example of this is Nordics where the TSOs are cooperating to 
balance the transmission network. They operate joint balancing power market and 
activate frequency controlled reserves in jointly manner (Fingrid 2015). This is not only 
cost effective but also releases some amount of generation capacity to the free markets 
which would otherwise needed to be kept as ancillary service. In regional markets the 
increased and economically optimized cross-border trading also naturally balances the 
power system. 
 
The fulfillment of the expected benefits can be measured by observing the economical 
effectiveness of regional electricity market. Zhang et al. are discussing the effectivity 
measures and they divide the effectiveness to short and long term efficiency. Short-term 
efficiency refers to the market operation efficiency and the increase in the social welfare. 
Therefore, it is affected by the market structure and by the behavior of the market players. 
Furthermore, because of the nature of the electricity markets and eventually the physical 
delivery of the electricity, the power grid restrictions can influence the short-term market 
efficiency. These three points form the three efficiency metering classes based on Zhang 
et al. article: the rationality of the market structure, the effectiveness of the market orders 
and market efficiency. The structure of the regional electricity market has major impact 
on the market operation and short-term efficiency. Factors influencing the structure are 
well aligned with the potential benefits. Firstly, the structural efficiency is affected by the 
amount of big players in the markets. Related to that, the concentration of the market 
power and the monopolization degree needs to also be taken into consideration when 
measuring the structural efficiency. Thirdly, the diversity of the production possibilities 
per fuel type needs to support the market model and in addition there has to be ability to 
meet the need of electric demand in the region. Finally, the structural efficiency relies on 
the degree of the interconnectivity in the region. (Zhang Yubo et al. 2008) 
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The second short-term efficiency metering class, the effectiveness of the market order, 
measures how well the market functions when different participants pursue different 
interests. Generation companies typically aim to maximize their revenues while 
transmission system operators need to also consider the interests of the whole market and 
the safety of the power system. In addition, regulators need to take into consideration also 
the social welfare on top of the aforementioned interests. In order to achieve truly 
effective operation in regional market such market model needs to be adopted where these 
partly conflicting interests can co-exist and do not harm the effectiveness of the market. 
For example, in order to retain the credibility of the market at all times the regulators need 
to have sufficient power to recognize and prevent harmful electricity trading actions. 
Furthermore, regulators need to be able to ensure equal and fair competition situation in 
the markets to keep it efficient. Correspondingly, transmission system operators need to 
be able to maintain security and stability in the transmission network to enable efficient 
market operations and physical delivery.  Third short-term metering class focuses on the 
overall market efficiency. However, measuring overall market efficiency can be a 
complex tasks and thus usually focuses primarily on social welfare. (Zhang Yubo et al. 
2008)  
5.3 Recommended market model for SEE area 
There are several possible market design options when considering competitive regional 
electricity markets. These market designs have each different kind of strengths and 
weaknesses. This study focuses on the European model which is the recommended design 
by World Bank’s study to be adopted to enhance the wholesale market opening in South 
East Europe region. 
 
In the World Bank’s study, four possible market models were considered: PJM (USA 
regional market between Pennsylvania, Jersey and Maryland), the European model, 
bilateral classic and bilateral with auction. All four options were evaluated based on eight 
different criteria: Security of Supply, Enhancing Investment Climate, EU Mainstream, 
Efficient Utilization of Transmission Grids and Generation, Market Price Reference, 
Integration of Renewables, Transparency and Implementation Costs. Each criterion in 
each market design option was evaluated from 0 to 10 and then multiplied with specific 
weight factor depending on the importance of the criterion. The results of the study show 
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that the European Model would fit best the SEE region since it scored highest almost in 
all criteria. The result of their analysis can be seen in Figure 10. (World Bank 2011) 
The security of supply got equal score for all models since it is assumed to be transmission 
system operator’s responsibility. The enhancement of the investment climate means the 
attractiveness of the markets for the investors. Therefore, possibility for liquid financial 
market and possibility for low risk operations in the market affect this category greatly. 
European Union mainstream criterion estimates how well the market model aligns with 
the existing European model. Since SEE area is part of Europe and the long term vision 
of EU is common pan-European market, it is worthwhile considering that aspect already 
when considering the regional market model. Effective utilization of transmission grids 
and generation represents the way market model supports transmission capacity 
allocation and the activation of the different generation types. For example, European 
model scored high here because of the merit order activation illustrated earlier in the 
Figure 4. Market price references measures the quality of the prices as investments signals 
to markets. Transparent prices representing well the zonal market situation are valuable 
signals towards the markets. Integration of renewables measures how the respective 
market model supports the activation of the renewable energy sources. In addition, it takes 
into account how the market model can adapt the generation fluctuation caused by the 
unpredictability of the renewable generation. Transparency is scored based on the level 
of access to different parts of price formation e.g. cost data of generation. Finally, the 
implementation cost category is self-explanatory since it estimates the cost of 
implementing the market model as regional electricity market solution. 
 
Figure 10. Evaluation on different market models. (World Bank 2011) 
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5.4 Regional Day Ahead market concepts 
The European market model was briefly described earlier in the chapter two using Nordic 
markets as example. The scope of this study limits on the Day Ahead part of the European 
market design.  In the Day Ahead electricity markets supply and demand are the two most 
important factors for determining the electricity price. Demand describes the willingness 
to buy some utility which consumer can afford. The law of demand states that while other 
factors stay as constant, the higher the price of the product is, the less demand there is for 
it. Other way around, the lower the price is, the more there is demand for it. Demand 
curve is typically descending due to the fact that the consumer received benefit from new 
unit of product is always less than the gained benefit from previous unit, which is called 
the marginal utility. (Parkin et al. 2005) In electricity markets demand originates from the 
electricity consumers such as factories or retail sellers. Demand is affected by electricity 
consumers desire to maximize their benefit with their available budget. In addition, 
demand is affected by the variable and fixed costs of the production and by the delivery 
obligations. Eventually, the aggregated demand curve is compiled by summing up all the 
demand curves of the single consumers. However, usually demand in electricity markets 
is quite inelastic due to the essentiality of the sufficient electricity supply.  In other words, 
demand is not affected much by the market price and consumers are willing to buy 
electricity almost at any price. Therefore, in this study demand is simplified to be entirely 
inelastic. 
 
Supply describes the willingness of selling utility and the possibility to gain profits from 
the sales. The law of supply states that while other factors stay as constant, the higher the 
price of the utility is, the more utility is produced. Following the same logic, the lower 
the price is, the less there is willingness to produce the utility. Opposite to demand, supply 
curve is typically ascending as each incrementing utility provides less profit. In other 
words, the production costs are increasing for each additional produced unit. (Parkin et 
al. 2005) In the electricity markets supply originates from power producers. Supply is 
affected by multiple factors such as production method and fuel prices. Also free 
competition in the markets affects the pricing of the supply. Eventually, the aggregated 
supply curve for the market is compiled by summing up all the individual supply curves 
of each power producer. 
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In the Day Ahead electricity markets the aim is to daily find optimal price and traded 
volume for electricity for every hour of the next day. In perfect market situation the 
optimal situation is always found at the intersection of the supply and demand curves, at 
market equilibrium (Parkin et al. 2005). The price at this point is called equilibrium price 
and the volume as the equilibrium volume. If the price of the utility is too high, there is 
more willingness to supply it than there is demand for it. Similar, if the price is too low 
there is more demand for it than willingness to supply the utility. In both described cases, 
over supply and over demand, the markets are not functioning efficiently and thus the 
situation is not beneficial for the suppliers or for the consumers. Therefore, the markets 
automatically move towards the market equilibrium to maximize the overall welfare. 
(Parkin et al. 2005) 
 
World Bank’s study recommends that the regional market should work in decentralized 
manner where each jurisdiction has their own local power exchange. The local power 
exchanges are responsible for collecting the electricity production and consumption offers 
in their local market area. Each local power exchange needs to then further compile all 
the received orders to aggregated supply and demand curves. These curves will then be 
further sent to the regional market operator. Regional market operator will then use the 
received aggregated supply and demand curves to calculate area prices for the respective 
areas, taking into account available transmission capacities between local power 
exchange areas. World Bank’s study proposes that the available transmission capacities 
should be allocated and sent to the regional market operator by so called coordinating 
auction office. This entity is cooperatively operated by regional TSOs.  (World Bank 
2011) 
 
The Nordic electricity market operated by Nord Pool Spot is following the European 
market model. Even though the market price is formed in common European solution, 
the market price is formed by finding the intersection of the aggregated supply and 
demand curves as described earlier. All the market participants, both producers and 
consumers settles with same price. This price is called Marginal Price. Due to the market 
model, producers typically offer their production based on the short-term marginal costs. 
Therefore, the production units with lowest the marginal cost of the production are 
activated first. As result, the economically most efficient production units will earn the 
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most. (Nielsen et al. 2011) Figure 4 in the chapter in two illustrates the logic behind the 
marginal price from the merit order point of view. 
 
In the regional markets, the transmission capacities are allocated in so called implicit 
auction. In the implicit auction, the day-ahead transmission capacities are taken into 
consideration already during the price formation process in order to maximize the overall 
social welfare for the whole region. Thus, the flows between the market areas are always 
based on the current status of the interconnected network and local markets. As results of 
such auction, the area prices for electricity reflect both the cost of the electricity 
production in each bidding area and the cost of the congestion in network. Furthermore, 
implicit auction ensures that the electrical electricity flows from surplus area to deficit 
areas. In other words, the electricity flows from low price areas to high price areas and 
thus balances the price differences between the unbalanced areas. As opposite to implicit 
auction, in the explicit auctions the transmission capacities are allocated separately and 
independently detached from the marketplace where the physical electricity trading is 
taking place. The capacities may be auctioned through annual, monthly and daily 
auctions. However, since the capacity auction is not subjected to the market forces, the 
result may end up providing less social welfare, less price convergence and more frequent 
adverse flows. (Nord Pool Spot 2014a) 
5.4.1 PCR and MRC 
The theory background for the regional power market cooperation was given earlier in 
this chapter. The theory has already been put into practice in two European projects: Price 
Coupling of the Regions (PCR) and Multi Regional Coupling (MRC). Basically, MRC is 
successor of PCR after more areas have joined the pan-European electricity market 
cooperation since the establishment of the PCR. Even though the explained framework 
for the regional power markets and the regional integration dimensions are steering 
towards a closely coupled market operations, the approach for the local control with 
regional cooperation should be emphasized.  
 
The World Bank’s study recommends such regional market design where the national or 
multinational electricity sector actors retain the local responsibility over all of the trading 
processes, procedures and trading platforms. Then in addition to the local operations, the 
electricity market cooperation can extend to the coupling of the multiple local Day Ahead 
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markets as regional market. (World Bank 2011) This operational framework is well 
adopted in the PCR and further in MRC solution. PCR framework includes three main 
principles, single price optimization algorithm, robust operation and individual local 
power exchange accountability. Single common algorithm and robust operations provide 
the required level of regional cooperation and the benefits described also in this study. 
Common algorithm for the whole region guarantees fair and transparent way of 
determining the day ahead electricity prices across Europe and optimal cross border 
electricity flows. In order to facilitate this common price calculation PCR relies on 
decentralized sharing of data and on the robust market operations and procedures. 
However, in the PCR framework each market area still holds their local control by having 
local power exchanges, transmission system operators and national regulatory authorities. 
(Nord Pool Spot 2015d) As can be seen from the PCR framework, the regional market 
solution does not necessarily require a centralized regional entities. Instead, regional 
markets and joint operations can also be achieved by retaining the local control and 
authority of the national market operators and further does not mean that all of the market 
activities need be implemented in one place.  
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6 Regional market simulations 
The need for the regional markets and its expected benefits are discussed in the previous 
chapters of this study. In addition, the South East Europe electricity sector was introduced 
and evaluated earlier. Based on the presented background information, this study 
investigates if the expected benefits could be achieved in the South East Europe region 
by carrying out day ahead market simulations. This chapter lays the base for the 
simulations and thus firstly describes the required additional simulation parameters. 
Secondly, a brief overview is given to the optimization algorithm Euphemia which is used 
to carry out the simulations. Next, the logic behind the input data and market topology is 
explained and finally the simulation procedure is briefly elaborated. 
6.1 Parameters for the simulations 
The most important values for the simulations, demand and available production 
capacities in the selected SEE market area were described earlier in this study in chapter 
three. However, these alone are not sufficient for a realistic simulation and thus also the 
network transmission capacities, the pricing of the generation methods and the capacity 
factors are required. 
6.1.1 Network transmission capacity 
Hourly network transmission capacity represents the maximum electricity flow that can 
occur in a transmission cable in one hour. Hourly network transmission capacities 
between selected jurisdictions are shown in Table 6 
Table 6. Day-ahead hourly network transmission capacities in MW. Datasource: 
ENTSO-E 
FROM/TO AL BA BG HR FYROM ME RS&XK 
Albania (AL)      142[2] 250[1] 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BA)    750  500 600 
Bulgaria (BG)     300  600 
Croatia (HR)  700     600 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)   100    300 
Montenegro (ME) 289[2] 500[3]     700[4] 
Serbia and Kosovo network area (RS&XK) 250 600 350 600 700 700  
[1]Assuming Albania -> Serbia is same as Serbia -> Albania 
[2]No data for DA NTC in ENTSO-E database, using highest flow from 2014 based on ENTSO-E data 
[3]Assuming Montenegro -> Bosnia is same as Bosnia -> Montenegro 
[4]Assuming Montenegro -> Serbia is same as Serbia -> Montenegro 
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The data for network transmission capacities is extracted from ENTSO-E database for 
Day Ahead Network Transmission Capacities (NTC). However, since only part of the 
interconnection data for Albanian and Montenegrin is provided in this database some 
assumption are made to cover the missing NTC values. For closest realistic estimation, 
electricity flows which occurred during 2014 were extracted from ENTSO-E database 
and the maximum hourly value of the occurred flows is used as transmission capacity 
between Albania and Montenegro. In addition, NTC values for both directions between 
Montenegro and Serbia and Kosovo network area and between Montenegro and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina are not explicitly given. Therefore, it assumed in this study that the same 
capacities are available for the both directions for these connections. Similar to these 
interconnectors, NTC value from Albania to Serbia and Kosovo network area was given 
also only for one direction. It is assumed that the same capacity is available also to the 
other direction i.e. from Serbia and Kosovo network area to Albania. 
6.1.2 Pricing of the generation types 
Generally electricity producers’ pricing methods are affected by multiple factors such as 
variable costs of production, shutdown and starting costs of the power plants, investment 
and fixed costs, emission trade prices and weather. However, the most affecting factor is 
the generation type and the marginal cost of production related to the specific production 
type. 
 
Levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) is generally used to benchmark and compare 
different generation technologies. Basically LCOE is the average price for the electricity 
needed to reach a net present value (NPV) of zero when the cash flow of the generation 
unit is discounted. It should be noted that this method does not include the value of the 
risk or different financing methods for the technologies. In addition, all the technologies 
are evaluated equally and same economic analysis is used. Therefore, the assumptions 
made when calculating LCOE have high sensitivity and may have high influence on the 
calculated LCOE values. Furthermore, in case of electricity generation the costs and the 
possible generation amounts can vary based on location, capacity, efficiency, operation 
and other similar parameters. These variables are usually not accounted in LCOE 
calculations. (Branker et al. 2011) 
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Levelized cost of electricity is calculated based on the cost for investment, operations and 
maintenance, fuel, carbon emissions and decommissioning provided by OECD countries. 
The equation may vary for some parts depending on a study but in most cases the equation 
(1) is used (IEA 2010). Nomenclature for equation (1) is presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Levelized cost of electricity equation nomenclature. 
Nomenclature Explanation 
Investmentt Investment costs in year “t” 
O&Mt Operations and maintenance costs in year “t” 
Fuelt Fuel costs in year “t” 
Carbont Carbon costs in year “t” 
Decommisioningt Decommissioning cost in year “t” 
Generationt The amount of electricity produced in year “t” 
(1 + r)-t The discount factor for year “t” 
 
 
𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸 =  
∑ (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+𝑂&𝑀𝑡+𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡+𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑡+𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡)∗(1+𝑟)
−𝑡
𝑡
∑ (𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡∗(1+𝑟)−𝑡𝑡
        (1) 
 
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) has done a study early 2015 
evaluating the recent LCOE values for common generation methods in Nordics. The 
values in NVE’s study are presented in NOK/kWh units. According to European Central 
Bank exchange records, on average one Euro equaled to 8,354 Norwegian crowns 
throughout the year 2014. (Europea Central Bank 2015). This exchange rate was used to 
convert the LCOE values into EUR currency for this study. The converted LCOE values 
based on NVE research are presented in Table 8. 
 
As discussed already earlier in this study, in the European market model the electricity 
price is heavily based on the marginal costs of production. In other words, the producers 
tend offer their production at price reflecting their costs to produce electricity. Levelized 
costs goes beyond the marginal costs taking into account also the investment costs. In 
addition, the LCOE values calculated in the NVE study are for brand new power plants. 
In reality, in the SEE region many of the power generation units are older and the 
investment might already be paid back which makes the LCOE values too high and 
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inaccurate to be used in the simulations. Therefore, since the European model is 
recommended for the SEE region, the marginal costs are used as pricing mechanism in 
the regional market simulations giving more accurate representation as pricing method. 
The marginal costs in the Table 8 are extracted from the NVE study. The operation costs 
for standalone solar energy are estimated to be 2,5% of the investment costs. The study 
shows that yearly investment costs for standalone solar photo voltage installations were 
around 12MNOK/MW. The marginal costs are calculated based on these two values. In 
addition, the marginal costs for wind power are representing the costs for on-shore wind 
power. It should be also noted that nuclear power production waste treatment is not 
included in the marginal costs shown in the Table 8. Finally, natural gas generation is 
expected to be mainly combined cycle production. 
 
Table 8. Levelized cost of electricity and marginal cost for different generation types. 
(Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat 2015) 
Generation type Marginal (EUR/MWh) LCOE (EUR/MWh) 
Solar PV 4.1 147.2 
Hydro 4.8 29.9 
Wind 18.0 48.6 
Nuclear 22.7 50.9 
Conventional Coal 36.4 50.9 
Combined cycle (natural gas) 64.2 71.7 
Peak load diesel generator (oil) 306.2 312.2 
 
Nuclear is mainly used as basic load in power markets due to its stable nature. It is 
relatively low cost and easy to run but shutdown down and startup of the nuclear power 
plant is expensive. Thus, nuclear generation is assumed to be inelastic in reference to 
price. In other words, electricity is generated by nuclear power plants regardless of the 
marginal costs. Hydro power has one the lowest marginal costs of production. 
Furthermore, it is relatively easy to decide when to produce electricity with hydro power. 
Usually some amount of hydro power needs to be generated in order to keep the river 
system balanced. For these reasons, the pricing of hydro production is usually a complex 
task. In Nordic markets the pricing of hydro production usually relies on the opportunity 
cost of production i.e. whether the power should be produced today or tomorrow. 
Therefore, hydro production usually reflects the year-ahead future prices of electricity 
announced in the financial markets. However, in this study based on the production mix 
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in the SEE region, it is expected that the coal production is the cap in merit order and 
therefore pricing of hydro power won’t affect much the simulations as long as its price 
remains lower than the marginal cost of conventional coal.  Thus, to avoid unnecessary 
complexity the hydro power capacity is fully priced based on the marginal costs in this 
study. Wind and solar power are usually produced based on the weather conditions. Since 
electricity is challenging utility to store and producing with low marginal costs plants is 
supported by European market model, both production types are expected to be inelastic 
in this study. Rest of the production methods are priced in reference to marginal costs. As 
result, generation type is activated if marginal price is higher than the respective marginal 
cost of production. 
6.1.3 Capacity factor 
Capacity factor compares the actual electricity produced by power plants to the electricity 
which could have been produced if the power plant would have ran at full rated power 
over the given time period. In case of hydro power, capacity factor depends on the water 
potential in the plant site and further on the yearly hydro reservoir level. In addition, the 
capacity factor is affected by the power curve of the utilized production unit. (Kaldellis 
et al. 2005, Pazheri et al. 2014) 
 
In this study it is expected that the fossil and the nuclear power plants can operate at 
maximum rate during the selected days. Thus, the capacity factor for these generation 
units is 100% and does not affect the net maximum capacities described earlier in the 
chapter three. In reality the capacity factors of the conventional generation units are 
usually affected by fuel costs, electricity prices and plant availability time (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration 2015b). However, these factors are not considered in this 
study to avoid unnecessary complexity and thus it is expected that suppliers provide all 
their available conventional capacity to markets regardless of the market situations. 
 
For the renewables the situation is slightly different since the potential generation 
amounts are affected by the available fuel amount, i.e. the water situation in the region as 
well as solar radiation and wind conditions. In addition, the capacity factors for renewable 
sources are usually considerable lower than for conventional fossil generation and nuclear 
power. Therefore, renewable and hydro power capacities are subjected to capacity factors 
in the performed simulations. United States Energy Information Administration (US EIA) 
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has calculated average capacity factor of 37,5% for conventional hydropower, 33,9% for 
wind and 27,8% for solar photovoltaic in 2015 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 
2015a). Pazheri et al. estimates that hydro power plants have capacity factor of 30-60% 
whereas onshore wind has 20-40% and ground-mounted photovoltaic have capacity 
factor of 15-27%. In addition, Kaldellis et al. have used capacity factor of 46,7% in their 
calculations for small hydro power in Greece (Kaldellis et al. 2005). From European point 
of view Eurelectric study from 2011 estimates capacity factor for hydro power to be 30-
80%, for wind 20-40% and finally for solar 10-20% (EURELECTRIC 2011). Based on 
these sources the average capacity factor for hydro power is close to 40%. Thus, it seems 
that the monthly capacity factors provided by EIA are close to this average value. These 
monthly capacity factors are applied to hydro and renewable production in the typical 
days of each month in this study to cover the seasonal variation. The capacity factors are 
shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Capacity factors (CF) from different sources and monthly values by EIA. 
(EURELECTRIC 2011, Kaldellis et al. 2005, U.S. Energy Information 
Administration 2015a, Pazheri et al. 2014) 
Source 
Hydro  
CF 
Wind offshore 
CF 
Solar PV  
CF 
Renewables 
CF 
US EIA 33,7 % 33,9 % 27,8 % - 
Pazheri et al. 30-60 % 20-40 % 15-27 % - 
Kaldellis et al. 46,7 % - - - 
EURELECTRIC 30-80 % 20-40 % 10-20 % - 
Average 40,0 % 30,0 % 30,0 % - 
January 36,3 % - - 40,4 % 
February 32,5 % - - 34,4 % 
March 41,3 % - - 39,6 % 
April 44,6 % - - 43,1 % 
May 45,3 % - - 34,5 % 
June 45,8 % - - 36,1 % 
July 41,9 % - - 26,7 % 
August 33,9 % - - 22,5 % 
September 28,0 % - - 26,0 % 
October 29,0 % - - 31,5 % 
November 33,0 % - - 42,2 % 
December 38,4 % - - 30,4 % 
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The share of the renewable energy resources in the regional generation capacity mix is 
small. Therefore, all renewable sources are grouped together as one generation source in 
the simulations. Since the capacity factors for wind and solar are close to each other and 
there is considerably more wind power capacity than solar capacity in the region the wind 
power capacity factors are applied for this grouped renewable generation cluster. Table 9 
shows that there tends to be more hydro capacity available for electricity production 
during spring and early summer months than during the winter months. Keeping in mind 
the yearly variation in demand shown in Figure 9, it can be seen that during the high 
demand months there is also less hydro capacity available. Other way around, during the 
summer months when there is generally less demand for electricity in SEE region, the 
capacity factors for hydro power production are also higher. Therefore, it is expected that 
due to the decreased availability of the relatively low price hydro power production there 
will be some price differences between winter and summer months. In addition, since 
there is less hydro production capacity available during winters, it may need to be 
compensated with other higher price methods such as coal and gas fired production. 
6.2 Euphemia 
Nord Pool Spot’s Day Ahead market systems were used to carry out the simulations in 
this study. In core of the price formation process is Euphemia algorithm. Euphemia 
algorithm was created as part of the Price Coupling of the Regions (PCR) project to be 
able to calculate electricity prices jointly across whole Europe. The aim is to maximize 
socio-economic benefits and increase market transparency. (EPEX Spot et al. 2013) 
 
In Euphemia model the market can be divided in bidding areas. Bidding area represents 
the smallest entity where orders can be submitted. Therefore, in the price formation each 
bidding area will get clearing price based on the orders within the respective area. In order 
to link bidding areas to each other Euphemia uses so called Available Transfer Capacity 
(ATC) model. In the ATC model each bidding area is connected to other areas in respect 
to the actual underlying network topology. Electricity can flow between the areas using 
these ATC lines and the amount of the flow is limited by capacity allocated for the ATC 
line. There can also exists bidding areas without ATC connections to other bidding areas. 
These areas are called island areas. ATC model is illustrated in Figure 11. (EPEX Spot et 
al. 2013) 
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Figure 11. Connected bidding areas in ATC model. 
 
In the PCR Day Ahead auction process the two base values for Euphemia calculation are 
the order books and the network data files from each European Power Exchanges. These 
order books contain aggregated supply and demand curve for each bidding area and 
complex order types such as block orders. The aggregated curves further include each 
individual supply and demand offer announced to the markets by electricity generators 
and consumers. Aggregated curves can be linear, stepwise or hybrid curves. Linear curves 
do not contain such curve points which have same price, whereas stepwise curve may 
contain consecutive points which always have either the same price or the same quantity. 
Hybrid curves are composed by both types of curves. The other fundamental input 
required for the price formation is the network topology data describing the ATC lines 
and bidding areas of the market. It also contains restrictions in the network such as 
allocated capacities for each ATC lines. (EPEX Spot et al. 2013) Nord Pool Spot is using 
also so called System Price plugin for Euphemia during the PCR Day Ahead auction 
process which performs such calculation where the network topology restrictions are 
ignored. As result, Nord Pool Spot will receive the System Price results. 
 
The calculation problem given to Euphemia algorithm is quite complex due to the order 
types and the amount of data. Thus, Euphemia runs combinatorial optimization process 
based on the modeling of the market coupling problem. The algorithm is designed to solve 
welfare maximization problem, also referred as master problem. It also searches optimal 
solution for three sub-problems to complement the result. Master problem solving aims 
to search the intersection of the supply and demand curves and optimal set of accepted 
complex orders which would result in the maximal socio-economical welfare for the 
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region. The sub-problems then further search for feasible price according to submitted 
orders and given price caps. The other two sub-problem calculations solve solutions for 
more complex orders. The basic solving logic of the Euphemia algorithm is illustrated in 
Figure 12. (EPEX Spot et al. 2013) 
 
Figure 12. Euphemia problem solving using master and sub problems. 
6.3 Orders for calculation 
In the European price coupling the price caps for single hourly orders are harmonized. 
Minimum price cap is set to -500€ and maximum price cap is set to 3000€. (Nord Pool 
Spot 2013) Price caps are used to determine the value field where the aggregated supply 
and demand curves need to intersect. If the intersect is not found within this area, then 
one of the curves is cut depending if the it is maximum or minimum price situation. Same 
price caps are used for this study simulation to align the simulation results for the SEE 
regional area with other Europe. 
 
Hourly demand profiles for each country are shown earlier in chapter 3 Figure 9. The 
profiles contain values for demand for each hour in each typical day for each month of a 
year. Using this data, jurisdiction specific demand offers are compiled. During recent 
times, real time demand response has increased as effective mechanism to balance price 
differences. However, demand response is not modelled as part of this study simulation 
since inelastic demand is more traditional case. Negative volume represents selling 
volume whereas positive volume represents purchasing volume. Inelastic demand offer 
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contains only minimum and maximum price steps with the same demand amount in 
megawatts (MW) for both price steps. Example of a demand singly hourly order for 
Croatia representing typical day in January can be seen in Table 10. 
Table 10. Single hourly order for total demand in Croatia for D1. 
Hour / Price -500 EUR 3000 EUR 
01:00 1681 MW 1681 MW 
02:00 1547 1547 
03:00 1476 1476 
04:00 1445 1445 
05:00 1456 1456 
06:00 1551 1551 
07:00 1805 1805 
08:00 1977 1977 
09:00 2103 2103 
10:00 2184 2184 
11:00 2207 2207 
12:00 2244 2244 
13:00 2222 2222 
14:00 2147 2147 
15:00 2077 2077 
16:00 2041 2041 
17:00 2153 2153 
18:00 2397 2397 
19:00 2417 2417 
20:00 2410 2410 
21:00 2332 2332 
22:00 2333 2333 
23:00 2179 2179 
24:00 1927 1927 
 
Supply offers are constructed based on the net production capacities shown in chapter 
three Figure 8. In the chapter 6 it was discussed and reasoned why wind, nuclear and other 
renewables are considered to be inelastic in this study simulation. Therefore, such 
inelastic productions have similar flat single hourly orders as shown in Table 10 for 
demand side. However, the productions methods which are priced against the marginal 
cost of production include an additional price step at marginal costs to adapt the activation 
level for each production method. The theoretical production amount is expected to be 
same for all hours in respect to the net maximum production capacity throughout the year. 
However, capacity factors for hydro and renewable generation varies depending on 
month. The orders for price calculation are built so that each jurisdiction has one demand 
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offer based on the demand profile and multiple generation offers to cover the different 
fuel types representing the available production capacities in the jurisdictions. The 
possible supply offers are Coal, Gas, Hydro, Nuclear, Oil, and Renewables. Due to the 
relatively small amount of other renewables than hydro in the region such as wind and 
solar they are all included in one and same inelastic order. Example of a supply offer for 
conventional coal power in Croatia is shown in Table 11. 
 
It should be noted that even though the jurisdictions in the region have different currencies 
in use, the regional market simulations are done in euro currency. The price optimization 
algorithm requires all orders to be in same currency in order to be able to calculate the 
market equilibrium. Therefore, Euro is currently used in the Price Coupling of Regions. 
If national power exchanges want to offer local currency trading for their customers, they 
must handle the currency exchange calculations in their own trading systems before and 
after the common price calculation.  
Table 11. Single hourly order for Croatian coal-fired production. 
Hour / Price -500 EUR 36,4 EUR 36,5 EUR 3000 EUR 
01:00 0 MW 0 MW 1505 MW 1505 MW 
02:00 0 0 1505 1505 
03:00 0 0 1505 1505 
04:00 0 0 1505 1505 
05:00 0 0 1505 1505 
06:00 0 0 1505 1505 
07:00 0 0 1505 1505 
08:00 0 0 1505 1505 
09:00 0 0 1505 1505 
10:00 0 0 1505 1505 
11:00 0 0 1505 1505 
12:00 0 0 1505 1505 
13:00 0 0 1505 1505 
14:00 0 0 1505 1505 
15:00 0 0 1505 1505 
16:00 0 0 1505 1505 
17:00 0 0 1505 1505 
18:00 0 0 1505 1505 
19:00 0 0 1505 1505 
20:00 0 0 1505 1505 
21:00 0 0 1505 1505 
22:00 0 0 1505 1505 
23:00 0 0 1505 1505 
24:00 0 0 1505 1505 
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6.4 Regional market area setup 
A fictional regional market area was created in the trading systems for the simulations. 
The created topology matches the electricity transmission network topology existing in 
the region in reality. This regional market is illustrated in Figure 13. Jurisdictions 
connected to each other with cross-border transmission capacities are also shown in the 
Figure 13, the NTC values are presented earlier in Table 6. In the Nordic electricity 
markets there are also additional limitations in addition to the transmission capacities such 
as network losses and ramping restrictions. Ramping restrictions are mainly used between 
asynchronous networks and the limitation aims to restrict the maximum amount of power 
flow direction change within an hour (Nord Pool Spot 2014c). However, in this study 
only available transmission capacities are used as restriction parameters in the price 
calculations since the regional network is synchronous. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Simulated regional market area. 
 
Figure 13 shows that the SEE area is quite well interconnected. One main advantage is 
that the Serbia and Kosovo network area is connected to all neighboring jurisdictions 
enabling power to flow fluently horizontally and vertically throughout the region if 
needed. In addition, almost all jurisdictions have interconnection lines to all neighboring 
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countries providing promising base for free electricity flow in the area. However, Albania 
and FYR of Macedonia border does not have ATC line. This will cut the full loop from 
Bulgaria to Croatia where electricity would not pass by Serbia and Kosovo network area, 
reducing the possible flow patterns. The transmission lines connecting outside of the 
regional market area are not considered here since the yearly net flow outside of the 
selected regional area is quite small and thus not considered in the market simulations. 
6.5 Simulation procedure 
Simulation in this study consists of twelve delivery days where each day represents a 
typical day in each month of a year. Since the electricity generation capacities are 
expected to remain same throughout the whole year all twelve delivery days have the 
same supply orders for all other generation methods expect hydro and renewables. 
Capacity factors for hydro and renewable generation vary depending on the month, which 
then changes the available production capacities and further the supply offers. 
Furthermore, demand is varying for each day to match the average situation in each 
month. The only limiting parameters in the calculation are the available network 
transmission capacities. The amounts of available transmission capacities vary during a 
calendar year in real life due to the maintenance and failure situations. However, these 
abnormal situations are not taken into consideration in the high level simulation 
performed in this study and thus the available transmission capacity values are also 
expected to remain same throughout the year. 
 
The simulation process used in study follows the proposed regional market method. Thus, 
firstly multiple supply orders were created for each jurisdictions to reflect the available 
generation capacities. Inelastic supply orders create a flat supply curve whereas price 
depended generation units create linear supply curves. Next, one demand curve is create 
for each jurisdiction to represent the total hourly demand in the area. In addition, available 
transmission capacities are added in the system. In the next step the aggregated supply 
and demand curves are generated for each network area by adding up the individual 
supply and demand curves created for the respective area. Finally, the order book 
containing the aggregated curves per network areas is generated, as well as the network 
data file containing the regional topology and capacity values for each connection line. 
The order book and network data file is given to Euphemia algorithm which then performs 
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the optimization calculations and determines the optimal area prices for each network 
area. Furthermore, Euphemia algorithm determines the optimal electricity flows between 
the network areas as implicit auction. The area prices and network flows are further 
passed to Nord Pool Spot’s post processing tool where the results for each portfolio are 
calculated based on the received area prices. In other words, the last phase of the 
simulation determines how much electricity is generated by each of the available 
generation units. 
 
One reference scenario was ran to complement the actual simulation. The same supply 
and demand curves were used in the reference scenario for each of the typical days but 
the available network capacities were set to zero in all hours. In other words, the reference 
scenario shows how the market situation would be in the region if the market operations 
were performed in each network area independently in islanded markets. However, this 
is slightly apart from real life since the explicit auctions for capacities and the results of 
the explicit auctions are not estimated on top of the reference case results. Currently, to 
balance out the demand and supply the network areas do some level of cross-border 
trading with explicit auctions as explained in the chapter four. 
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7 Results and analysis 
The aim of the simulation was to analyze in high level if the benefits of the regional 
market could be achieved in SEE region. Real underlying data was used in the simulation 
in order to provide realistic results. The simulation provided three important indicators to 
evaluate if the benefits could be achieved: generation utilization pattern, prices for the 
region and flows between the simulated market areas. The results are further elaborated 
in this chapter and conclusions are drawn to evaluate if the expected benefits could be 
obtained. 
7.1 Generation utilization 
The simulation results for the fictional SEE regional electricity market provided valuable 
data showing how generation units would be utilized if a common electricity market was 
efficiently operated in the region. The analysis of the production utilization results is 
further broke into different levels, starting with the overall production pattern in the 
region, shown in the Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14. Expected regional net production during the typical days. 
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As expected, nuclear and renewable production are run at maximum level during all of 
the simulated days. Nuclear and renewable production were set to be inelastic i.e. 
electricity could be produced regardless of the price. This result reflects well also real life 
where nuclear energy is widely used as baseload in the generation mix. Figure 14 also 
shows that the next economical production method, hydro production, is run at maximum 
level during all simulated days. However, there are some fluctuations in the production 
amounts due to the capacity factors used in the simulations to take into account the 
variation in the yearly availability of the hydro generation capacity. The amount of 
electricity produced by hydro power is at highest level during the typical days in April, 
May and June. On top of the hydro production there are varying amounts of coal-fired 
production throughout the simulated time interval. Figure 14 shows that the coal 
production profile follows tightly the regional demand profile illustrated earlier in chapter 
3 Figure 9. Thus, the results clearly indicate that the coal-fired production units are 
activated to generate the remaining electricity needed after nuclear, renewable and hydro 
production to meet the regional demand. The regional production profile matches the 
identified seasonal and hourly variations of the demand. It should also be noted that small 
amounts of gas-fired production is required in typical days of January, February and 
December when the demand is at highest. In addition, the results show that there is no 
need for oil-fired production in any of the simulated days. Peak load generation units are 
usually used only in extreme cases when something unexpected occurs in the markets or 
region. Averaged approach naturally smooths off such extreme cases from input data and 
thus it was expected that heavy peak load hours might not occur during the simulations. 
Oil-fired production would act the similar way as the gas-fired production does in the 
results and would generate the required addition electricity for the peak load hours. 
 
Since the averaged days were created to represent a typical day in each month, these days 
are now used to generalize the whole month. Therefore, the production amount for a 
typical day shown in results is multiplied by the days in the respective month to cover the 
whole month. This way the expected yearly production amounts can be investigated. 
Figure 15 illustrates the calculated expected yearly production rates per fuel type for each 
jurisdiction. Results show that the expected yearly production pattern in the region is very 
similar to the one which occurred in 2013.  
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Figure 15. Expected yearly electricity production rates. 
 
Figure 15 shows that most of the electricity would still be produced with coal-fired units 
if all regional production capacity was subjected to regional day ahead market. The next 
biggest production cluster would be hydro, followed by nuclear. However, the gap 
between coal-fired production and hydro production amounts would be considerably 
smaller than in the 2013 values shown in Figure 7. In the simulations 45% of all electricity 
was generated by coal-fired units and 36% of all production was hydro power. In 2013 
the respective shares were 52% for coal-fired and 31% for hydro. Thus, the simulation 
results indicate a clear increase in the hydro production amounts as well as a clear 
decrease in coal-fired production amounts. Indeed, it seems that the SEE regional day 
ahead market would have allocated the production capacities in more cost efficient way. 
The shares of the renewable and nuclear productions are quite the same in the simulation 
results as what was actually realized in year 2013. The explanation for the similarity can 
be found from the inelastic nature of the production methods: both methods tend to 
produce electricity regardless of the price and market situation. The similarity between 
these two production amounts in Figure 14 and Figure 7 indicates also that the simulation 
was realistic and reflecting well the real life. Interestingly, the simulation results show 
that there was considerably less gas-fired and oil-fired production than what occurred in 
2013. The expected decrease in these production amounts can originate from two things. 
Firstly, the averaged approach using typical days does cut the extreme cases where gas- 
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and oil-fired productions are mostly used. Secondly, due to the implicit capacity auction 
used in the simulation, the market situation in the power system is much better handled 
and thus the extreme cases might not even occur if a regional market would be established 
in the area. Finally, the total regional production amount was close to 123TWh in the 
simulation results. Keeping in mind that the real occurred production amount in the region 
was close to 135TWh in 2013, it can be seen that the amount in simulation results do not 
match one to one to that. However, the total electricity export outside of the simulated 
region was around 11TWh in 2013. Electricity exports outside from the region naturally 
directly increases the production amounts inside the region and are included in the 
production statistics. However, the required export amounts were left out from the 
simulations due to the complexity restraints. Thus, after subtracting the given export 
amount from the 2013 regional production amount the 2013 regional production amount 
actually ends up to 124TWh, which is almost identical to the amount in simulation results. 
Again, this similarity in the simulation results and the real life data indicates successful 
and realistic simulation results. 
 
One reference case was ran in addition to the actual regional day ahead market simulation. 
Same regional market topology, same production capacity amounts and same supply and 
demand offers were used in the reference case. However, all available transmission lines 
between bidding areas were removed by setting the available capacities to zero. In other 
words, each jurisdiction was an isolated area and had to match their demand with their 
own installed production capacity. Figures 16 and 17 illustrates the results from this 
reference simulation. 
 
The reference case results show that without a regional market and implicit auctioning of 
cross-border capacities the nuclear and renewable production amount remain identical 
compared the actual SEE regional market simulation. However, the amount of coal 
production is reduced almost by 13% because it was not possible to produce electricity 
more economically in other areas and transfer it to deficit areas. Instead, the deficit areas 
need to cover some of the production with gas-fired and oil-fired units. Furthermore, the 
hydro production profile has changed since surplus areas cannot transfer the excess to 
neighboring areas. The biggest deficit areas were Albania, Croatia and Montenegro. This 
production pattern also resembles the one which occurred 2013. Therefore, the results 
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from reference simulation back the statement that regional day ahead electricity markets 
in SEE region would have allocated better the available production capacities.  
 
 
Figure 16. Expected regional net production without transmission capacities. 
 
Figure 17. Expected yearly electricity production rates without transmission 
capacities. 
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7.2 Prices 
Simulations provided two kind of prices as result: Area price and System price. Area price 
is specific price for each bidding area. Area prices for each bidding areas can differentiate 
from each other based on the demand and supply situation within each area. Thus, it 
represents the marginal price for each bidding area. In Nordic electricity markets, the 
physical trading takes place based on the Area price and thus both producers and 
consumers settle with the same price. Area price is calculated so that available 
transmission capacities are taken into account. Therefore, congestion in certain 
transmission lines can lead to price differences between the bidding areas. On the 
contrary, System price is calculated so that transmission capacity limitations are ignored 
and thus it represents the price in pure market equilibrium. In other words, System price 
takes into account only the demand and supply offers in the whole region and calculates 
the price at their intersection. As results of this, the system price is always the same for 
all bidding areas throughout the whole region. In the Nordic electricity market System 
price is mainly used in financial markets. (Nord Pool Spot 2014b) However, in this study 
System price is used as a reference price to illustrate such situation where there would be 
enough available transmission capacity in the region to host perfectly functioning markets 
with most efficient flow of electricity. 
 
System price results for the simulated twelve days are illustrated in Figure 18. Keeping 
in mind that the marginal cost for conventional coal production was 36,4 EUR/MWh, it 
can be seen that the system price settles quite close to this for each of the days and hours. 
This means that in perfect market situation where there would be no congestion between 
the bidding areas, the coal fired production is the last generation type needed to be 
activated in order to meet the demand. Some minor variation can be observed from the 
results. The system price varies between 36,41 EUR/MWh and 36,5 EUR/MWh due to 
the interpolation for the supply curve. When comparing the demand profile and the 
seasonal and hourly variation in the System price, it can be seen that the minor variation 
in the System price follows the same pattern as demand does. Therefore, the results 
indicate that at the seasonal level the System price is lowest during the low demand 
months and highest at the winter months which are the high demand periods. Similar, at 
daily level the system price usually is highest during peak hours 17:00 – 19:00 and lowest 
during night hours. 
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Figure 18. System price in simulated region. 
 
The available transmission capacities were shown earlier in the chapter 7 Table 6. That 
data elaborated that the SEE region is well interconnected. In addition, based on that data 
it seems like there is also quite a lot of available capacity between SEE jurisdictions. This 
situation is reflected well in the Area price results. In fact, Area prices were almost 
identical to the System prices in all bidding areas throughout the twelve simulated dates, 
as illustrated in the Figure 19. The results show that electricity was able to flow between 
areas so freely during the simulated days that all other jurisdictions than Bulgaria had 
identical prices for all hours of the simulation. These results indicate that the regional 
market would perform extremely effectively if all network capacity was allocated for the 
regional Day Ahead market and implicit auction. 
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Figure 19. Area prices in simulated region. 
 
Figure 19 shows also six distinctive price peaks. First two price peaks are at the peak 
demand hours in typical day in January and typical day in February. During these peak 
hours the area price has risen to 64,2 EUR/MWh in all other areas expect in Bulgaria. The 
marginal cost of the gas-fired production was also defined to be 64,2 EUR/MWh in the 
simulation. Therefore, the price results back up the fact that some gas-fired production 
had to be activated to meet the high demand in the peak hours in the winter months. In 
addition to the peak demand, also the capacity factors for hydro production were below 
average during these days, which further explains the need for gas-fired production. The 
amounts of the activated gas-fired production can be seen in Figure 14. Figure 19 shows 
identical peak also for few hours in typical day in December which can be explained with 
the same reasoning. However, Figure 18 does not show this kind of peaks for the System 
price. Therefore, it seems like there are congestions in Bulgarian borders. In other words, 
Bulgaria would have capacity to produce more electricity to cover the peak demands in 
other jurisdictions of the region but there is not enough transmission capacity to 
physically transmission the required electricity to the deficit areas. However, this also 
means that Bulgaria can easily meet its own demand and thus the price remains lower 
than in rest of the region. Three remaining price peaks are below the average price level 
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and occurring only in the Bulgarian bidding area. These occur during low demand hours 
01:00 – 05:00 in typical days in April, May and June. The demand profile in Figure 9 
shows that demand is lowest during these months. In addition, the capacity factors for 
hydro production are at highest during these months, meaning that there is more hydro 
production available than in other months. Again, due to the congestion in Bulgarian 
interconnection lines the low price peaks are occurring only in Bulgaria.  
 
The reference simulation without any transmission capacity clearly shows the benefits of 
regional electricity market in SEE area. Figure 20 illustrates this situation, note that the 
scale of the figure is logarithmic due to the high variation in the price values. In this case, 
almost all bidding areas end up in different area price and the price seems to be much 
more volatile.  
 
 
Figure 20. Area Prices without transmission capacity in logarithmic scale. 
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Figure 20 shows that Bulgaria has the lowest area prices and can produce electricity with 
only nuclear, renewables and hydro at the marginal cost of hydro productions for several 
hours. However, in reality the lowest prices might be somewhat higher if the hydro 
production would be priced against the opportunity cost of production rather than 
marginal costs. Similar to Bulgaria, the Area price in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also at 
low price around 4,9 EUR/MWh for few hours while the maximum price stays still only 
at 36,46 EUR/MWh. Third lowest price level in the reference case is in Serbia and Kosovo 
network area where the area price is close to 36,5 EUR/MWh throughout the whole 
simulation interval. Other jurisdictions clearly suffer from not having cross-border flows 
and price balancing between the neighboring areas. FYR of Macedonia has to active gas-
fired generation units during winter months and peak demand hours and thus the area 
price rises to 64 EUR/MWh, whereas during low demand periods the local demand can 
be met mainly with hydro and coal production and the price stays close to 36 EUR/MWh. 
Croatia has to active not only gas-fired units but also oil-fired production for several hours 
during the simulated dates. Therefore, the base level of Croatian area price stays around 
64 EUR/MWh but can rise all the way to 306 EUR/MWh during the peak load hours. The 
most volatile area seems to be Montenegro where the price of the electricity fluctuates 
between 4,88 EUR/MWh and the maximum price of 3000 EUR/MWh. This means that 
during the high demand periods there is not sufficient amount of production capacity in 
Montenegro to satisfy the local demand but on the other hand during the low demand 
periods hydro production alone can cover the demand. Figure 20 shows also that Albania 
suffers the most from the situation where there is no transmission capacity between 
bidding areas. The Area price in Albania stayed at maximum price 3000 EUR/MWh for 
all simulated hours. Basically there is not enough production capacity in Albania to meet 
the demand in any of the hours during the year. Thus, the demand needs to be curtailed 
to meet the level of production capacity. Keeping in mind that the Albanian Area price 
was around 36 EUR/MWh in the regional market simulation for almost all hours, it seems 
that having an effective regional electricity market with implicit capacity auctioning 
would be highly beneficial for Albanian electricity sector.  
 
Comparing the simulation price results to the current price level in the SEE region is 
challenging since any of the countries do not yet operate transparent day ahead electricity 
spot markets. Thus, the price information available may include regulation and other price 
 79 
 
components such as transmission fees. Nevertheless, Eurostat provides electricity prices 
excluding taxes and levies for industrial consumers with annual consumption between 20 
000 and 70 000 MWh. Even though the given price does not perfectly match the day 
ahead market spot prices, they provide some indication of the current price level in the 
region. These prices are illustrated in Figure 21. The price information for FYR of 
Macedonia is from 2013 since 2014 data is marked as confidential. In addition, Albanian 
prices are not provided by Eurostat. 
 
 
Figure 21. Electricity price for industrial consumers in 2014. (Eurostat 2015b) 
 
Figure 21 shows that Croatia has the highest price level having electricity prices around 
62 EUR/MWh. Also Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro have price levels above 50 
EUR/MWh and further rest of the jurisdictions have prices above 40 EUR/MWh. The 
simulation results in this study indicate that the electricity spot price would set close to 
36 EUR/MWh for nearly whole year if calculated in effective regional day ahead 
electricity market. All of the jurisdictions have currently higher electricity price level, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina being closest with 43 EUR/MWh. Especially consumers in 
Croatia would gain notable benefits if their electricity would be traded through regional 
electricity market. Currently the price differences in the region are quite reasonable. 
However, the difference between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is as much as 19 
EUR/MWh. Simulation results show that all jurisdiction in the region would have close 
to identical prices throughout the year if regional electricity market would operate in the 
area. Equal electricity prices would further benefit the area in terms of electricity sector 
investments. 
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7.3 Flows 
The third part of result analysis concentrates on the expected electricity flows in the 
region. In the regional electricity market the price is determined by taking into account 
the available transmission capacities. Therefore, in order to gain maximal socio-economic 
benefit for the region there usually occurs some electricity flows between the areas. This 
way electricity can be produced on site where it costs least. Simulation results provide 
flows between bidding areas for each simulated hours. The flows during the typical days 
of each month are treated as average case for the whole month. Thus, the hourly flows 
are summed up to total daily flows between bidding areas and further multiplied by the 
amount of days in the respective month. This way the expected yearly export and import 
amounts are achieved. The expected yearly exports and imports between simulated areas 
are shown in Table 12. 
Table 12. Expected yearly flows between bidding areas in GWh. 
FROM/TO AL  BA BG HR ME FYROM RS&XK Export 
AL          0,0   0,0 0,0 
BA        3279,8 674,4   174,7 4128,9 
BG            2628 5256 7884,0 
HR    0,0         0,0 0,0 
ME 1893,0  1,5         19,7 1914,2 
FYROM      0,0       1269,6 1269,6 
RS&XK 232,1  616,9 0,0 3535,3 1134,8 9,6   5528,6 
Import 2125,0  618,3 0,0 6815,1 1809,2 2637,6 6720,0   
 
Table 12 shows that Albania, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia and Serbia and Kosovo network 
area were net importers of electricity whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and 
Montenegro were net exports of electricity. The trend of power flows seems to be similar 
to what actually occurred in 2013 with one distinctive exception. During 2013 Serbia and 
Kosovo network area was clearly net exporter. However, the simulation results indicate 
that in SEE regional electricity market that area would be net importer instead. The 
change originates from the fact that simulation didn’t take into account any flows outside 
of the region. In addition, when calculating the electricity prices and flows jointly in 
implicit auction the regional system dynamics change compared to explicit auctions. Even 
though all of the interconnectors have clear dominant flow direction, there are flows 
occurring in both directions for almost all lines. This indicates that the jurisdictions in the 
region are able to support each other in cases where deficit and excess areas are varying. 
 81 
 
Furthermore, this kind of behavior is indicating that many of the power systems are 
complementary to each other. In other words, the production capacity fleets in different 
jurisdiction can operate smoothly together if the allocation and activation is done in 
jointly manner. 
 
The flow results are in line with the price and production utilization results. The reference 
simulation without transmission capacities showed that Albania and Croatia were the 
biggest deficit areas. Therefore, it is natural that they are also the biggest electricity 
importers. Imported electricity will increase the supply in the jurisdictions and therefore 
lowers the prices. In addition, the reference simulation results show that Bulgaria can 
produce electricity at low price all around the year. Thus, when transmission capacity is 
introduced in the price optimization, Bulgaria naturally ends up as net exporter. Serbia 
and Kosovo network area has high figures for both export and import. This is due to the 
key location of their network area, locating in the center of the region. Hence, Serbia and 
Kosovo network area would probably function as transit area in SEE regional markets. 
 
The flows in each cross-border links are netted together to see in which direction the net 
flow is expected to occur. This will further give a better view on the flow dynamics in the 
region. The expected net flows based on the simulation results and actual net flows from 
2013 are illustrated in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22. Excepted net flows from simulation and occurred real flows in 2013. 
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As can be seen, the trend is similar in both cases. Some of the Serbia and Kosovo network 
area dynamics have changed since the directions of net flows between Montenegro, 
Albania and FYR of Macedonia and it have changed. The simulation results display that 
in cases when Bulgarian and Serbia and Kosovo network area border is congested, some 
of the Bulgarian excess electricity is transferred also through FYR of Macedonia. 
Generally, the flows are pointing to the deficit areas Croatia and Albania. In both cases 
Serbia and Kosovo network area is functioning as transition area.  
 
7.4 Conclusions 
The most important benefits which can be achieved from the efficient regional electricity 
market cooperation were discussed previously in this study in chapter six. Four distinctive 
benefits were introduced: specialization, reduction of the market power of a single market 
participant, improved economic signals for the markets and finally the costs reductions 
from elimination of the overlapping institutions. Regional Day Ahead market simulation 
and the reference simulation with isolated areas performed in this study gave a high level 
implications whether these benefits could be achieved in the South East Europe region 
within the selected jurisdictions. 
 
Results show that there would be a change in the regional production utilization pattern. 
It seems that less coal-fire production would be needed due to the better allocation of the 
hydro power production. This is a clear sign of improved specialization i.e. with regional 
electricity market cooperation the selected jurisdictions could produce electricity in the 
most economical and profitable way. This kind of specialization in the electricity 
production business would have further impact also on the electricity prices by leveling 
them out since the electricity flows between jurisdictions would be allocated with implicit 
auction in the regional market solution. In addition, the reference simulation implies that 
without a regional market cooperation and explicit auctions some amount of the 
production capacity would not be utilized at all, resulting in not optimal market result.   
 
Simulation does not explicitly reveal if the market power of the single market participants 
would be reduced in the SEE region due to the fact that the ownership structures of the 
production capacities are not investigated closer in the scope of this study. However, in 
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the simulation all the production capacities in the region were aggregated and thus the 
overall market shares of the big national producers are naturally reduced. In addition, the 
SEE electricity sector outlook showed that none of the jurisdictions possess major share 
of the total production capacity in regional scale. Therefore it is reasonable to say that the 
benefit of spreading the market power could be achieved with regional electricity market 
cooperation in South East Europe.  
 
Simulation results provided almost identical prices for the whole selected region. On the 
contrary, there are some differences in the electricity prices currently in the region. 
Furthermore, the results show that the expected system price would be quite stable 
throughout the whole year. Consequently, less volatility in the price provides safer 
climate for electricity sector investments. Thus, the benefit of the improved economic 
signals towards the market could also be realistically achieved. Finally, the fourth benefit, 
the cost reductions from eliminating the overlapping institutions, remains somewhat 
unanswered in the scope of this study. The performed simulations do not take into account 
the required institutions needed to establish an efficient regional electricity market neither 
does this study give any recommendations for market operations other than what was 
already provided in the presented World Bank’s study.  However, the overview to current 
market opening statuses in the selected jurisdictions revealed that the region is already 
moving towards jointly operated institutions such as Coordinated Auction Office. Thus, 
achieving the fourth benefit seems to be also reachable for the region. 
 
The electricity flow results point out that especially the border between Bulgaria and 
Serbia would be congested in peak situations. Thus, it would be beneficial for the region 
to increase interconnection capacity on this border in order to retain the market efficiency 
and equal regional prices also during the peak situations. In addition, Albania and FYR 
of Macedonia do not have cross-border capacity between them at all. If regional market 
would be operating in the region, then introducing interconnectors into this border would 
further increase the possibilities for electricity flows in the region. Thus, it would also 
ease the Bulgarian border congestion situations and increase the effect of the possible 
benefits. In addition, the better the region will be interconnected the better the regional 
network reliability will be and the liability of the electricity deliveries will increase. 
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8 Summary 
This study researched the benefits of regional cooperation in the South East Europe area 
including the jurisdictions of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. At first, the 
theory background behind electricity market liberalization was introduced by discussing 
the change from bilateral trading to power exchange based trading. It was pointed out that 
power exchanges provide more security, lower trading costs and increased competition 
for the market participants. In addition, electricity trading in power exchanges is more 
transparent and provides better price signals for the markets. Also a brief outlook to 
European Union energy policy was given, providing information about the Energy 
Packages which are the driving forces for the reforms in the electricity sectors. 
 
Chapter three concentrated on the South East Europe electricity sector by providing key 
values for the selected jurisdictions. The electricity sector review showed that in regional 
level the demand has been quite constant during the past four years. In 2013 the regional 
electricity consumption was close to 100TWh. The largest shares in the regional 
consumption belong to Bulgaria and Serbia since both had their final electricity 
consumption around 27TWh in 2013. On the production side, the regional yearly 
production amount was close the 135TWh in 2013. Most of the electricity is produced by 
coal-fired generation and hydro power production. Rest of the production is covered by 
nuclear, gas-fired, renewable and oil-fired generation. Out of the selected set of 
jurisdictions Albania, Croatia and FYR of Macedonia were net electricity importers in 
2013 whereas rest of the jurisdictions were net exporters. Jurisdictions in SEE also trade 
electricity with neighboring areas. Finally, the demand profiles in each jurisdiction were 
investigated by using averaged approach where a typical day for each month was 
calculated. Some seasonal and hourly variations were identified in the demand profiles. 
 
In addition to the electricity sector outlook, also market opening status outlook was given 
in chapter four for each selected jurisdiction. Vertical and horizontal unbundling of the 
electricity sectors were investigated along with the electricity market statuses and 
eligibility thresholds. It was found that there has been quite stable and well progress in 
the reforms. However, the reforms are in quite difference phases in different jurisdictions. 
Serbia and Bulgaria seem to be furthest with their reform processes and both jurisdictions 
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have plans to establish local Day Ahead electricity markets through power exchange. 
Croatia is slightly behind the two aforementioned jurisdictions since the vertical 
unbundling is not fully finished. However, also Croatia has ongoing project for local Day 
Ahead market with power exchange. Rest of the jurisdictions are more behind from the 
full market liberalization.  
 
Chapter five introduced the concept of regional power market and discussed the expected 
benefits. Three dimensions of the regional integration were identified: infrastructural, 
regulatory and commercial integration. These three dimensions describe the level of 
cooperation required in the electricity market field to gain the possible benefits. However, 
it was also pointed out that regional integration does not necessarily require centralized 
entity where regional market equals to regional solution. Instead, regional cooperation 
and local control approach was emphasized and the example of the PCR cooperation was 
introduced. Four distinctive benefits were introduced: specialization, spread of the market 
power, improved economic signals and costs reductions by eliminating overlapping 
institutions. In addition, it was noted that regional cooperation in electricity markets can 
lead to increased network safety and can also create cost reductions due to the more cost 
efficient market operations. Finally, European Market Model was discussed as it is 
identified as optimal market model for SEE area by World Bank’s study.  
 
Regional Day Ahead market simulation for the selected region was also carried out in this 
study to investigate if the expected benefits could be achieved in the selected jurisdictions. 
Real underlying data of the region was used as input for the simulation. In addition, a 
reference simulation was carried out where otherwise identical input data was used but 
all transmission capacities between the jurisdictions were removed. Simulation result 
analysis was broke into three parts: generation utilization, prices and electricity flows. 
The results showed that with the regional market most of the electricity would still be 
produced with coal-fired production. However, the simulation results indicate that the 
coal-fired production amount from total production amount would decline by 7% while 
hydro production share would increase by 5%. Therefore, the results show that the 
generation utilization would be allocated more efficiently with a regional day ahead 
market. The reference simulation results backed the statement since in these results the 
more expensive gas-fired production had to be activated. In addition, reference simulation 
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resulted in deficit situations in some of the jurisdictions. The expected regional yearly 
production amount in simulation results was 123TWh while it was 124TWh in real life 
in 2013. Thus, the simulation was deemed to be quite realistic. 
 
Price results contained two type of prices: System price and Area price. System price 
illustrates an optimal situation where there are no restrictions in the market area whereas 
Area price reflects the market situation in each specific area. Results show that the System 
price reflects the merit order of activation as expected in European Market Model. System 
price stayed between 36,4€ and 36,5€ in all of the simulated days. This was expected 
since in the optimal situation the coal-fired production is always the last required 
generation unit in the selected region. Also Area price results indicated stable prices for 
the whole region. However, due to the transmission line congestions in the peak situations 
few price peaks were identified, giving a lower price for Bulgaria and higher price for the 
rest of the region. Again, the reference simulation showed that a Regional Day Ahead 
market would provide benefits for the region since in these results the Area price was 
quite volatile in all of the jurisdictions due to the seasonal and hourly variation in the 
demand. The current electricity price level in the region is somewhat higher than the 
expected price level based on the simulation results. 
 
Lastly, the electricity flow results show that Albania, Croatia and FYR of Macedonia 
would be net importers whereas rest of the jurisdictions would end up net exporters of the 
electricity. This trend is quite similar to the real life values from 2013. Flow results also 
reveal some congestion especially in Bulgarian borders. Overall, the simulation results 
indicate that the benefits of regional a cooperation in the electricity markets could be 
achieved in the region. Stable prices and change in production patterns indicate better 
specialization in electricity production. In addition, stable prices across whole one year 
would provide safe environment for electricity sector investments and further reform.  
 
A natural way of increasing regional cooperation in the SEE area would be to continue 
electricity sector reforms and establish local power exchanges after which the 
jurisdictions can apply to join PCR/MRC cooperation and thus couple their electricity 
markets in respect to the European market model. Investigations how to achieve and 
roadmap this cooperation development process remain as further research theme. 
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